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I. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN AMERICA
Violence against women is a systemic, pervasive problem affecting all facets of
society. "Globally, violence against women is manifested through persecution,
torture, rape and violence by intimate partners."' "Many countries encourage or
support violence against women through their legal systems, policies and cultural
practices.",2 This practice has been institutionalized and legitimized in America,
especially in the legal system. Violence against women is the most perverse and
destructive form of gender inequality.3 "Massive efforts ha[ve] been made in the
1970s and 1980s to ensure equal opportunity for women: equal opportunity in
employment, in education, in the application of family and criminal law.' 4 The
question becomes, however, what is the benefit of these advances if women cannot
enjoy them because they are victimized in their own homes. "In a sense, violence
against women [is] the ultimate weapon against gender equality-it [can] wipe out
in a single blow any and every advance... [and] opportunity created by over twenty
years of law reform."5 To that end, the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA")
was passed in 1994 as part of President Clinton's crime bill.
VAWA provided federal grant money for community efforts to fight violence
against women (e.g., domestic violence shelters,7 state databases to track reporting
of rape and domestic violence,8 a national study on campus sexual assault,9 and
reports on battered women's syndrome'0 ). Additionally, it provided for increased
lighting on public transportation and money for emergency phones," a national
domestic violence hotline,'" and a host of educational training programs for state and
federal judges to raise awareness about violence against women. 13  The most
controversial aspect of the bill was the civil rights remedy, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, for
victims who could prove crimes committed against them were gender-motivated.' 4
1. Jenny Rivera, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy
Implications & Litigation Strategy, A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association ofthe Bar of the City ofNewv
York, Sept. 14,1995,4J.L. &POL'Y 409,410(1996).
2. Id. at 410-11.
3. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act:
Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Sept. 14, 1995,4 J.L. & POL'Y 427,427 (1996).
4. Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's
Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WOMEN's LJ. 1, 5 (1996).
5. Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
6. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)). VAWA is encompassed as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 in Title IV, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 10402(a)(1) (1994).
8. See id. § 13962(1994).
9. See id. § 14012 (1994).
10. See id. § 14013 (1994).
I1. See id. § 13931(b)(1)(A), (C) (1994).
12. See id. § 10416(d) (1994).
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10417(a), 10418(a), 13992, 14036 (1994).
14. See id. § 13981 (1994).
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Section § 13981 was considered an appropriate use of congressional power
granted by the Commerce Clause. This traditionally expansive congressional
authority was called into question with the recent Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Lopez. 5 As a result of Lopez, questions have been raised regarding the
constitutionality of legislation regulating non-economic activities passed under the
Commerce Clause prior to Lopez.
Section I provides an overview of state attempts to address the issue of violence
against women, specifically rape and domestic violence. Section II provides a
legislative history of the Violence Against Women Act focusing on the controversy
sparked by the civil rights remedy (§ 13981). Additionally, Section II considers the
constitutional underpinnings of § 13981, its roots in modem day Commerce Clause
authority and its possible usurpation posed by the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez. Section IH highlights two district court cases, Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University16 and Doe v. Doe, 7 and their
conflicting decisions regarding theconstitutionality of § 13981, post-Lopez.'" Section
IV critiques theBrzonkala court's rationale in declaring § 13981 unconstitutional and
addresses the scope of Lopez. Courts interpreting Lopez as a prohibition of
congressional authority to regulate non-economic activities under the Commerce
Clause clearly misconstrue the case. Lopez merely stands for the proposition that
where Congress wishes to regulate local or intrastate activities that are non-economic
in nature, it must do so only in cases that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Because § 13981 does not infringe on traditional state powers and because violence
against women has a substantial impact on interstate commerce, § 13981 will survive
any constitutional challenges.
A. Rape
1. The Problem of Rape in America
While rape is an international problem, "[i]n 1990 the United States led the
world with its number and rate of reported rapes."' 9 In America, it is estimated that
15. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
17. 929 F. Supp. 608 (Conn. 1996).
18. The 1995 Supreme Court decision in Lopez called into question Congress's broad authority under the
CommerceClause. The 60-year expansion of Commerce Clause poweris discussed infra Part II.C. The Lopez decision
provided the rationale for at least one district court to declare VAWA's civil rights remedy unconstitutional. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
19. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S.15 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 193 (1991) [hereinafter Victims of the System Hearings 102-3691 (citing United States
Department of Justice Statistics Special Report, International Crime Rates, May 1988). Additionally, "in 1990 the
rape rate in the United States was20 times higherthan it was in Portugal, 26 timeshigherthan inJapan, 15 timeshigher
than in England.... and 46 times higher than in Greece." Id.
1999]
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a woman is raped every six minutes and usually by someone she knows.20 One study
reported that 84% of rape victims "knew their attacker;"2' further "[a] study of 2,291
adult working women found that 39 percent of rapes were committed by husbands,
partners, or relatives." 22 Almost exclusively, rapes are committed by men against
women.' Rape has risen "four times as fast as the total national crime rate over the
past 10 years." '24 A Department of Justice ("DOJ") survey concluded that "in total,
women aged twelve and older annually sustain almost five million violent
victimizations; approximately five hundred thousand of these... are rapes and sexual
assaults."
In 1988, the "Surgeon General of the United States found domestic violence to
be the number one public health risk to adult women in the United States."26 Almost
ten years later, violence against women still poses the "leading cause of injuries to
women .... ages 15 through 44 years."27 Violence causes more injuries to women
than "automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined."'2 Some experts
estimate that women have "between a 1-in-5 and a 1-in-8 chance of being raped in
[their] lifetime" resulting in "at least 12.1 million women" being victims of rape.29
Finally, rape and the threat of rape cross all socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic lines.
While the individual impact of rape can be long-term, 0 rape does not just affect
20. See Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues, Violence Against Women (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter Violence
Against Women Facisheet] (citing Uniform Crime Report 1989; National Crime Survey 1989) (unpublished factshect,
on file with author).
21. See Victims of the System Hearings 102-369, supra note 19, at 259 (statement of Dr. Leslie R. Wolfe,
Executive Director, Center for Women's Policy Studies).
22. Id.
23. See Violence Against Women Factsheet, supra note 20.
24. S.REP.No. I01-545,at30(1990).
25. Johanna R. Shargel, Note, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106
YAIEL.J. 1849, 1849 (1997) (citing Ronet Bachman & Linda E. Saltzman, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violence Against
Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 2 (1995)).
26. Ruth Jenny& Kelly Gaines Stoner, Domestic Violence and the North Dakota Best Interests Statute, 72 N.D.
L. Rnv 10 11, 1014 (1996).
27. Surgeon General Antonio Novell, "From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, Journal of the
American Medical Association," 267 JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. See Andrea Parrot, Medical Community Response to Acquaintance Rape-Recommendations, in
AcQUAINTANCERApTET r'HIDDENCRimE310 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991). Rape victimsgenerally
suffer from rape trauma syndrome which involves among other things nervousness, fear of being alone, nightmares, and
loss of appetite. See Christine A. Gidycz & Mary P. Koss, The Effects ofAcquaintance Rape on the Female Victim,
in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THe HIDDEN CRIME 272,278, 310 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer cds., 1991). Rape
trauma syndrome results in absenteeism from work, loss of productivity, depression (suicidal tendencies in some), and
prevents women from leading productive and fulfilling lives. See id. at 272-77. Other symptoms can include:
"helplessness, shock and disbelief, guilt, humiliation and embarrassment, anger, self-blame, flashbacks of the rape,
avoidance of previously pleasurable activities, avoidance of the place or circumstance in which the rape occurred,
depression, sexual dysfunction, insomnia, and impaired memory." American Medical Association, SexualAssault in
America (visited Oct. 7,1998) <http://www.-ama-assn.org/publicreleases/assault/action.htm>. Additionally, studies
have shown that rape victims are more likely to consider themselves "less healthy, visited a physician nearly twice as
often, and incurred medical costs overtwice as high as women" who had not been raped. Id. (emphasis added). Finally,
"[t]he level of violence experienced during the assault was found to be a powerful predictor of future use of medical
services." Id.
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its specific victims.3I Rape and the threat of rape have a severe psychological and
economic impact on all women evidenced by women restricting where and when they
work, with whom and how they socialize, and generally by limiting the ability of
women to lead happy and productive lives.
2. Inadequacy of the State Response to Rape
Ironically, even with the high frequency of rape, rape myths are still prevalent
in American society, ultimately discouraging the reportage of rape, and more
importantly impeding the prosecution and conviction of rapists.32 One of the biggest
obstacles to effective prosecution and conviction of rapists is the inadequate definition
of rape by most state statutes. The first definition of rape was articulated by Lord
Chief Justice Matthew Hale in which he stated that rape "is an accusation easily to
be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused
though never so innocent. 33 The inherent message from such a definition is that a
rape victim's testimony should be viewed with suspicion, and this suspicion is still
evident in the contemporary definition of rape.
a. Definitional Problems
Lord Hale's definition eventually evolved into the common law definition of
31. See American Medical Association, Sexual Assault in America (visited Oct. 7, 1998)
<httlpJ/www.ama-assn.org/public/releaseslassault/action.htm>. "Followingsexual assault, victimsoften pull away from
intimate relationships or, alternatively, become regressively fearful, clinging, and needy. Family members can find
themselves dealing not only with their own reactions to the assault on their loved one, but also with the psychological,
medical, and behavioral changes they see in the victim." Id.
32. Rape myths come in many forms, but following are the most common. (1) Myth: Most rapes are stranger rapes;
Reality: Most rapes are committed by someone the victim knows. See Laurie Bechhofer & Andrea Parrot, What Is
Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINrANCERAPErTHEHIDDENCRIME 10 (Andrea Parrot& Laurie Bechhofereds., 1991).
In recent years, date rape or acquaintance rape has increased where a woman is raped by a friend or acquaintance in
the home or workplace. See Victims ofthe System Hearings, supra note 19, at 259-60. Women are conditioned to
fear "strangers", but the reality is women are more at risk with those they intuitively trust. (2) Myth: Marital rape is
not as harmful; Reality: Rape, especially marital rape, is destructive. See Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate
Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 689-91
(1996). It is a common misconception that if the victim and perpetrator are involved the rape is not hurtful when in fact
it may be even more so. See id. Victims who are raped by someone they know experience not just a violation of their
body but a violation of trust with someone they love. (3) Myth: Rape is just forceful sex by men who cannot control
themselves; Reality: Rape is not about sex; it is about power and control. See Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and
Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCERAPE: THEHIDDEN CRIME 32 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofereds., 1991).
Similar to domestic violence abusers, rapists seek to control, humiliate, and dominate their victims typically because
they feel they cannot control their own lives. See id. (4) Myth: Women secretly wish to be raped; Reality: Women do
not ask to be raped either by the clothes they wear or the behavior in which they engage. See id. While some women
may enjoy more intense forms of sex, they do not desire to be victimized and tortured. See generally SUSAN
BROWNNMLE ,AGAINSrOUR WILL: MEN,WOMIENANDRAPE (1976); SEDELEKATZ, UNDERSTANDINGTHERAPEVICnM:
A SYTErISiS OFRESFARCH FINDINGS (1979); LERoYG. ScHuLTZ RAPEVIcnMoLOGY (1975).
33. Ricki L. Tannen, Reporter, Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA.
L. REv. 5, 875-76 (1990) (citing M. HALE, I THE HISORYOFTHE PLEAS OFTHI CROwN 635-36 (1 st Am. ed. 1837)).
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rape: intercourse "with a woman not his wife; by force or threat of force; against her
will and without her consent." ' This definition continues to serve as the "essence"
of most rape statutes even in the "most radical reform statutes." '35 Under the Model
Penal Code ("MPC") rape is defined as intercourse "compel[led]... by force or by
threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnaping"; most
states use some version of the MPC definition. 6 The problem with rape continues
to be the definition and scope. The closer the relationship between the victim and
perpetrator, the less likely the crime is viewed as rape. This is vividly evident in the
concept of marital rape.
Today it is a crime for husbands to rape their wives; however, this is the result
of statutory reform occurring only in the last twenty years. 7 Prior to 1976, a
husband could not be charged with raping his wife because of the Marital Rape
Exemption. 8 While most states have reformed their marital rape statutes, "only 17
states and the District of Columbia have completely abolished the marital rape
exemption."39 Despite this, the overall effect of the exemption continues in states
imposing strict reporting guidelines or requiring that victims report the rape within
a short amount of time.' Other states only "reduce[d] the grade of the offense to a
lower level than that which applies in the case of a stranger rape."4 Even in states
that statutorily abolished the marital rape exception, there is still a presumption if the
victim and perpetrator were involved a rape cannot have occurred. For example,
some states have statutes exempting cohabitants and dating companions as well as
spouses from sexual assault laws, thus precluding women from reporting their
significant others.42 "[C]ohabitation is an affirmative defense to rape in Connecticut,
34. SUSAN ESTRICH, REALRAPEn HOWTHELEGALSYSI'EM VICnM2ES WOMEN WHOSAYNO 8 (1987).
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. WAYNER.LAFAVE.,MODERNCRIMNALLAW: CASES COMMENISANDQUESTIONS 866 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Model
Penal Code § 213.1 (Official Draft 1962)).
37. SeeSexual HarassmentandRapePreventionProgram[hereinafterSHARPP], The WifeRapeInformationPage
(last modified Jan. 22, 1998) <http:llwww.unh.edu/student-lifelsharpp/marital.html>. "In 1981, ten states barred
prosecutions of husbands for marital rape." Eskow, supra note 32, at 681 (1996). "By 1990, no state retained an
absolute marital rape exemption, although thirty-five states placed limits on the prosecution of marital rapists," which
"included non-cohabitation or aggravated force requirements, ceilings on punishment, specifications on when-and to
whomn-marital rape must be reported, and the creation ofaltemative, frequently misdemeanor, sexual assault statutes
that applied when criminal behavior otherwise classifiable as felony rape happened to be perpetrated by a spouse." 1I.
at 681-82 (footnotes omitted). "By 1994, twenty-four states had abolished any form of [the] marital rape exemption";
however, "at least thirteen states still offer preferential or disparate treatment to perpetrators of spousal sexual assault."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
38. See SHARPP, supra note 37.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., CAL PENALCODE § 262(b) (West Supp. 1999) (spouse must report rape withino ne year to prosecute).
41. Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence andthe Commerce Clause: The CivilRights Provision
of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM.L.REv. 1876,1887(1996). See, e.g., TENN.CODEANN.
§§ 39-13-503,507 (Supp. 1998) (marital rape is class C felony and rape is class B felony); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-
67.2:1 (West 1996) (different sentencing guidelines for rape (five years to life) and marital rape (one year to twenty
years)).
42. See, e.g., KAN.STATANN.§21-3501(3) (Furse 1995) (parties must be living apart, legally separated, or seeking
divorce before charges may be filed); MD. ANN. CODEart. 27, § 464D (Michie 1996) (parties must have legal separation
document or be living apart three months prior to the rape); MISS. CODEANN. § 97-3-99 (1994) (affirmative defense
to spousal rape if parties are living together); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (spouses must be living apart to prosecute
marital rape). See also NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., The Violence Against Women Act of 1991
[Vol. 34:367
6
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regardless of the legal status of the relationship between the victim and the
defendant."'43 Additionally, in Delaware men are "shielded" from prosecution if the
"'victim... is in the defendant's company on the occasion of the offense as a result
of the victim's exercise of rational intellect and free will' and "has engaged in
consensual sex with the defendant within the past year."'
Beyond inadequate definitions of the crime of rape, proving the elements of rape
presents victims with a second obstacle to overcome. Reliance on the level of force
used and corroboration make the possibility of a successful rape prosecution very
weak. Most rapists use as their weapons, in addition to sexual intercourse,
intimidation and threats; this coupled with the fact that most victims are assaulted by
someone they know diminishes the likelihood of excessive force.45 Additionally, while
these tactics may have long-lasting psychological effects, 6 they rarely have
measurable physical effects thereby increasing the difficulty in satisfying the element
of force.47
The element of corroboration is likewise flawed. "[C]orroborative evidence of
rape is more difficult to secure than for many other crimes." 4 Many times there are
no witnesses, "no contraband,"49 sometimes little or no signs of force, and no medical
evidence.50 These definitional hurdles place too much burden on victims. In effect,
these definitions create a proportional relationship between the level of brutality a
victim suffers and the credibility she receives as a victim from law enforcement and
the legal system.
b. Misperceptions of Rape Victims
Despite and possibly because of the difficulty in proving the elements of rape,
rape victims are faced with skepticism when they report rape to law enforcement.5'
In particular, many victims are accused of falsely reporting rape, when in reality
"[e]stimates indicate that only 2 percent of all rape reports prove to be false, a rate
comparable to the false report rate for other crimes., 52 "[F]alse reports are no more
(S.151H.R. 1502): Facts On the Civil Rights Provision 3 (1991) (unpublished factsheet, on file with author).
43. Eskow, supra note 32, at 683 (citing CO. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(b) (West 1994)) (emphasis added).
44. Id. (citing DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. I1, §§ 761(h), 775(a)(2) (1987 & Supp. 1994)).
45. See generally Esmi=H, supra note 34, at 58-71.
46. See generally Parrot, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
47. See EsnmtcH, supra note 34, at 21, 7 t.
48. Id. at 21.
49. Id.
50. See id.; Violence Against Women Factsheet, supra note 20.
51. See Tannen, supra note 33, at 886 (citing Tactics, Verdict in Rape Case Stir Outrage, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
6, 1989, at 3B). Consider a Florida woman who was raped, but her perpetrator was not convicted because the jury
believed she "asked for it" by wearing a lace miniskirt and tank top. Id. She said after the trial she felt "more
victimized by the system" than the rapist. Id. According to the victim, the "police badgered her, interrogat[ed] her like
a criminal, and... prosecutors... displayed indifference toward her." Id.
52. S.REP.No. 102-197, at 45 n.48 (1991) (quoting M. Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the
Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013 (199 1)); see also Laurie Bechhofer and
Andrea Parrot, WhatIsAcquaintanceRape?, in ACQUAINTANCERAPE THEHIDDENCRIME 1 (Andrea Parrot &Laurie
1999]
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likely for rape than they are for other serious crimes."53 This skepticism is indicative
of a societal distrust of rape victims.5 4 Disbelief of victims contributes to low arrest
rates, low prosecution rates, and even lower conviction rates. 5' Further, the idea that
sexual assault victims are not credible impacts victims at all levels and stages of the
legal system. The direct impact of these societal attitudes can be seen in jury
attitudes toward victims. A study conducted by two jury consultants, Harry Kalven
and Hans Ziesel, found that many juries in rape cases are prejudiced against the
prosecution and empathize with the defendant, especially if there is evidence of
"contributory behavior" on the part of the victim.5 6 "Contributory behavior" included
"hitchhiking, dating, and talking with men at parties."' The results of these societal
attitudes speak for themselves: "[s]tudies of individual jurisdictions have found that
only 20 percent (Washington, D.C.) or 25 percent (New York City) or 34 percent
(California) or 32 percent (Indiana) of felony arrests for rape result in convictions." '58
Compare this with the 61% conviction rate for robbery and the 69% conviction rate
for murder and it is evident that states are failing miserably in the prosecution of
rape.59 Alice Vachss, former Special Victims Bureau prosecutor in the district
attorney's office in Manhattan, summed up the inadequacy of prosecuting rapes this
Bechhofereds., 1991) ("Mhe number of acquaintance rapes falsely reported to the police is negligible." (New York
City Police Department 1972)). "[L]ess than 1% of reported rapes in Los Angeles County have been found to be false
reports (a lower false report rate than for either robbery or homicide)." University of Wisconsin, (visited Oct. 7, 1998)
<http://cwis.usc.edu/00/Campus-Life/Women/Women%27s_-Resource-Guideassaultmyths>.
53. See Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAMNrANCERAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME. 28
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991).
54. This distrust of women is not just relegated to violent circumstances. Many men, especially those in law
enforcement, continue to hold patriarchal and archaic views concerning women. See Esmicti, supra note 34, at 15
(citationsomitted). Consider the following statement by a superiorlaw enforcement officer. "women, like Kotex,should
be used once and thrown away." Tannen, supra note 33, at 888, (quoting Unidentified Witness, remarks to the Florida
Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Comm'n (1988)). These kinds of misogynistic comments reflect our society's
deeper suspicion of women. The distrust of rape victims in particular begins at an early age. See American Medical
Association, Facts About Sexual Assault, (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org/publict
releasesfassault/facts.htm>.
A survey of I l-to-14 year olds found:
* 51% of the boys and 41% of the girls said forced sex was acceptable if the boy, "spent a lot
of money" on the girl;
* 31% ofthe boys and 32% ofthegirls said it was acceptable for a man to rape a woman with
past sexual experience;
* 87% of the boys and 79% of girls said sexual assault was acceptable if the man and the
woman were married;
* 65% of the boys and 47% of the girls said it was acceptable for a boy to rape a girl if they
had been dating for more than six months.
Id. (citing Jacqueline W. White & John A. Humphrey, Young People's Attitudes Toward Acquaintance Rape, in
ACQUAiNTANCERAPE: THEHIDDEN CRIME43-56 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991)). "In a survey ofhigh
school students, 56% of the girls and 76% of the boys believed forced sex was acceptable under some circumstances."
Id.
55. In Florida, a state with one of the highest rates of sexual assault, 6,524 rapes were reported in 1988. See
Tannen, supra note 33, at 889. Less than one-third of these rapes ended in arrest. See id. Less than 50% of those
arrested for rape are convicted. See S.REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993) (citations omitted). The high conviction rates
for murder (69 %) and robbery (61%) is evidence of the low priority rape cases are given both by law enforcement and
prosecutors. See id.
56. ES'mICH, supra note 34, at 19.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 17 (footnotes and citations omitted).
59. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at42 (1993).
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way:
There is a large, more or less hidden population of what I later came to call
collaborators within the criminal justice system. Whether it comes from a police
officer or a defense attorney, a judge or a court clerk or a prosecutor, there seems
to be a residuum of empathy for rapists that crosses all gender, class, and
professional barriers. It gets expressed in different ways, from victim-bashing to
jokes in poor taste, and too often it results in giving the rapist a break.'
The problem, however, does not end with the inequity ofrape prosecutions. Domestic
violence, which also disproportionately affects women, has received even less
attention in the legal system. While some contend the national consciousness was
raised by the O.J. Simpson trial, the focus on violence against women was supplanted
by the focus on race. 6' The reality is that domestic violence is still grossly under
reported and under prosecuted.62
B. Domestic Violence
1. The Problem of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is a systematic infliction of physical, emotional, and
economic terror resulting in the erosion of a woman's self-esteem and her ability to
lead a productive life.63 David Adams, who works at a domestic violence program
60. AUCES.VACHSS,SExCRIMES:TENYEARSONTHEFRONTLINEPROSECUING RAPISTSANDCONFRONTINGTHEIR
COLLABORATORS 30 (1993). Vachss goes on to assert there are only three defenses to rape: "[i]t never happened;...
[s]he consented; ... [i]t wasn't me." Id. at 110. Vachss describes the challenges she faced not only in prosecuting
crimes many found "losers," but also her experiences as a female attorney in a traditionally male profession. See
generally id.
61. See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE RUN OF His Lim THE PEOPLE V. OJ. SIMPSON (1996), for a realistic
overview of the OJ. Simpson trial.
62. See generally RAOUL FELDER & BARBARA VICTOR, GEIING AWAY wrni MURDER: WEAPONS FOR THE WAR
AGAINSTDOMESTIC VIoLENcE (1996); ANNJONES,NEXTTIMESHE'LLBEDEAD: BATERING & HowTO STOp IT (1994)
for a comprehensive overview of domestic violence, including prevalent myths and the inadequacies of state criminal
statutes.
63. See Arlington Co. Victims of Violence, Volunteer Training Manual (Fall 1993) (unpublished material, on file
with author). There are generally three phases of domestic violence: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the battery
phase; and (3) the honeymoon phase. See id. During the tension-building phase, the abuser finds excessive fault with
everything the victim does. See id. Initially, the victim tries to rectify whatever is upsetting the abuser. See id.
Ultimately realizing that nothing will satisfy the abuser, the victim usually retreats to avoid upsetting the abuser. See
id. This retreat only serves to increase the abuser's antipathy toward the victim; the tension increases until it results in
battery. See id. The battery phase can last a few seconds up to 24 hours. See id. It can include anything from a single
slap, prolonged beatings with hands and blunt instruments, to death. See id. During the honeymoon phase, the abuser
is usually apologetic and remorseful; he may promise never to hit the victim again or even agree to seek counseling.
See id. Typically, however, the battery continues. Over time the tension-building and battery phases increase in
frequency and severity and the honeymoon phase decreases. See id. When the victim decides to leave the abuser, the
victim is in the greatest danger because the abuser feels as if he has lost all control overhis life and may use lethal force
to control the victim. See id. Domestic violence is about power and control--the abuser controls and dominates the
victim's life because he feels inadequate in his own. See id. One woman serving a life sentence for killing her abuser
in self-defense commented, after being asked if serving time was worth killing her abuser, that she had more freedom
19991
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in Boston, defines domestic violence as: "any act that causes the victim to do
something she does not want to do, prevents her from doing something she does want
to do, or causes her in either case to be fearful of her partner."6 4 Domestic violence
historically has been viewed as a "private matter" and ultimately as a "normal"
consequence of marriage.6 In America, the roots of the battle against domestic
violence date back to the Temperance Movement initiated by middle-class women to
stop men from coming home intoxicated and subsequently beating their wives. 66 Until
the turn of the century, many states sanctioned husbands beating their wives, provided
they used sticks no thicker than the width of their thumbs.67 With such laws, the
colloquial phrase "rule of thumb" was born. 8 Jack Greenberg, former Director of
the NAACP, said that domestic violence in marriage is as "American as apple pie.'6 9
Even the term "domestic violence" diminishes the lethality and brutality of the crime
and the belief that it is in fact a crime.7" "So well does the phrase 'domestic violence'
obscure the real events behind it that when a Domestic Violence Act (to provide
money for battered women's services) was first proposed to Congress ... many
thought it was a bill to combat political terrorism within the United States."7'
Similarly the phrase "crime of passion," which is often used to refer to domestic
violence, is confusing because it lends credence to the myth that domestic violence is
merely an "argument" between intimates.' Finally, so little consideration is given to
domestic violence that there are more shelters for abused animals than for abused
women and children.73 In the United States in 1993, there were approximately 3,800
animal shelters, compared with approximately 1,500 shelters for domestic violence
victims and their families.74
A common misconception is that domestic violence only involves an occasional
push, shove, or slap. In reality it is much more violent.' In fact, domestic violence
in prison than she did living with her abuser. See DEFENDING OUR LiVEs (Cambridge Documentary Films, Inc. 1993).
Incidentally, it won the Academy Award for Best Documentary in 1993.
64. FEDER & VICTOR, supra note 62, at 237.
65. See JONES, supra note 62, at 19-20.
66. See SARA M. EvANs, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORYoFWoMEN IN AMERICA 126-27 (1989).
67. See Tannen, supra note 33, at 850 (citing Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman
Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony?, 39 MERcERL.REv. 545,548 n.16 and accompanying text (1988)).
68. See id.
69. NaftaliBendavidThe Surprising Volatility ofthe ViolenceAgainst Women Act, LEGALT M Es, June 20, 1994,
at 16.
70. See Nourse, supra note 4, at 1 (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 37 (1991)).
71. JoEs, supra note 62, at 82. See generally id. at 81-87. Some criticize terms like "spousal abuse" for
"defin[ing] [the] crime 'by relationship."' Nourse, supra note 4, at 1.
72. See GAVINDEBEcKER, THEGiFrOFFEAR: SURvIvALSIGNALsTHATPRorEcTUsFRoMiVIoLENcE 184 (1997).
"That phrase is not the description ofa crime-it isthe description ofan excuse, a defense. Since 75 percent ofspousal
murders happen after the woman leaves, it is estrangement, not argument, that begets the worst violence." Id.
73. See Violence Against Women Factsheet, supra note 20, at 7 (citing Senate Judiciary Comm., 1990).
74. See Arlington Co. Victims of Violence, supra note 63.
75. See S.RE'.No. 102-118, at 6 (1992). A study conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee found that many
instances of domestic violence involve a high level of brutality. See id. Consider the following results:
A 26-year-old Connecticut woman is attacked by her boyfriend of 5 years; he breaks her
right arm with a hammer.
A Texas woman is threatened with a gun by her husband of 18 years. After slapping her,
he tells her to load the gun. Threatening to kill her, he hits her with the butt of the gun,
10
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abusers use many of the same tactics which Amnesty International identified as
tactics employed by terrorists against hostages including, "isolation, monopolization,
... threats .... demonstration of omnipotence, degradation, and enforcement of
trivial demands."76 Domestic violence is a "chronic" and frequent problem; "[i]t is
persistent intimidation and repeated physical injury" that increases with frequency
and severity over time.77 It is estimated that a woman is beaten every seven
seconds.78 "Over 1 million women in the United States seek medical assistance each
year for injuries sustained by their husbands or other partners." '79 Additionally, "[a]s
many as 20 percent of hospital emergency room cases are related"80 to domestic
violence, yet only half of medical school curriculums include information on domestic
violence.8 ' This lack of education is just one practical example of society's
unwillingness to deal with domestic violence. The legal system has contributed to the
misunderstanding about domestic violence by refusing to offer substantive civil and
criminal remedies to victims of domestic violence.
2. The Inadequacy of State Response to Domestic Violence
a. Misperceptions of Domestic Violence Victims
Because domestic violence has long been considered a "family problem," many
victims face a multitude of challenges in filing, processing, and prosecuting a
domestic violence charge. The "majority of domestic violence incidents are classified
only as misdemeanors" despite the fact that had they been committed by a stranger
they would be classified as felonies.82 "As a result, the system tends to justify its
nonintervention by reason of quantity, the number of those at potential risk, rather
drawing blood and rendering her unconscious.
* A 21-year-old Florida woman is beaten in the head by her father with a pipe 3 inches in
diameter.
* A 15-year-old Connecticut girl is stabbed by her ex-boyfriend, shortly after he has been
released from jail for abusing her.
* A 27-year-old New Mexico woman, 8 months pregnant, is pinned up against a wall of her
home by her husband of 5 years. He beats her with a broomstick and threatens to kill her.
* A Colorado woman is abused by her husband in their home. To frighten her, he breaks the
legs of their dog and, to prevent her from leaving, he disables her car.
Id.
76. FELDER & VICTOR, supra note 62, at 45.
77. S.REP.No. 101-545, at 36 (1990). Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") "have identified
a direct link between battering and the spread of HIV and AIDS among women." JONES, supra note 62, at 87 (citing
Sally Jacobs, In Hub and Beyond, HIVSeen as Latest Whipfor Batterers, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 1993, at 21,24).
78. See FELDER & VICTOR, supra note 62, at 21.
79. S.REi. No. 10 1-545, at 37 (1990). See also Anne Stein, Will Health Care Reform Protect Victims ofAbuse?
Treating Domestic Violence as a Public Health Issue, 21 HuM.RrS. 16(1994). For a discussion of the discrimination
domestic violence victims face from insurance companies, see generally Julie Goldscheid& Pamela Coukos, Insurance
Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 206-08 (1996).
80. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
81. See FEDR & VICTOR, supra note 62, at 56.
82. Maloney, supra note 41, at 1886-87.
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than quality, the seriousness of the crime committed."83
Additionally, "[domestic violence calls are the largest single category of calls
to which police respond."'84 Most officers dislike responding to domestic disturbance
calls for fear of being assaulted and injured. However, reports of officers being
injured in the line of duty have been overstated and serve only to deter officers from
granting domestic violence the attention it deserves.86 Even when officers do respond
to domestic calls, many times these responses do not end in the arrest of the abuser,
despite women having injuries requiring hospitalization or medical attention.87
Consider the horrific experience of Tracey Thurman who was attacked by her knife-
wielding husband in her home.88 She was knocked down, kicked in the face, stabbed
twelve times, and had her neck broken by her husband, all in the presence of a police
officer watching from his vehicle.89 Her husband succeeded in attacking her three
times in the presence of police officers before he was arrested.90 These instances are
the norm, not the exception. 91
b. Enforcement Issues--Mandatory Arrest Laws
To address the burgeoning problem of domestic violence, some states have
adopted mandatory arrest laws which require a responding officer to arrest an abuser
if there is evidence of domestic violence. 2 A National Crime Survey reported that
"calling the police, however good or bad their response, did, in fact, deter repeated
83. FELDER & VICrOR, supra note 62, at 28.
84. Tannen, iupra note 33, at 853.
85. See id. at 853-54. Despite empirical studies discounting this myth, police training manuals have not been
revised to accurately reflect the "threat" in responding to domestic disturbance calls. See id. Florida's Gender Bias
study found that"lawenforcementagenciesplacea low priority on educating theirofficerson domestic violence issues."
Id. (citing Gender Bias Study Comm'n, Florida's Criminal Justice System's Response to Domestic Violence 6 (1988)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Florida State Archives, R.A. Gray Building, Tallahassee, FL. 32399-0250)).
86. See id.
87. See FELDER & VICTOR, supra note 62, at 24-25.
88. See id. at 15-17.
89. See id. at 15.
90. See id. at 15-16. Tracey Thurman was ultimately awarded $2.3 million in compensatory damages in a civil
suit against 24 officers of the Torrington County Police Department in Torrington, Connecticut. See id. at 26. This
award was not without a hefty price. Thurman is permanently disfigured and partially paralyzed. See id. at 17.
Thurman was terrorized by her husband priorto the incident for months and notified all appropriate family services and
law enforcement agencies to no avail. See id. She suffered her most damaging injuries under the watchful eye of the
police. See id.
91. See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 61, at 51-67. Florida's GenderBias Study found a statewide problem with police
"insensitivity to physical injury" resulting in "the failure to arrest or report domestic violence." Tannen, supra note
33, at 855. One officer's solution to domestic violence victims was to "give him some [sex] and he won't need to beat
you"; another's solution was to"take five". Others insist on persuading victims not to pursue charges. See id.; see also
JONES, supra note 62, at 40-41. In a period often days, three women in New York, each with a protection order, were
killed by their abusers despite the women's reporting abusers' activities to the police. See id. at 18-48.
92. Sometimes referred to as "discretionary" and "non-discretionary" arrest laws respectfully. See FELDER &
VICTOR, supra note 62, at 137.
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violence." '93 The survey, conducted over a five-year period, estimated that 2.1 million
women were victims of spousal abuse.94 "Of those, 1.1 million, [contacted] the police
themselves" or had a person witnessing the violence contact police.9' In these cases,
no further incidences of violence were reported to the police for six months following
the original complaint. 96  Despite these results, fewer than half of states have
embraced mandatory arrest laws.97 Even in states that have implemented such
policies, typically they are poorly enforced if at all.9" A study of the Phoenix Police
Department revealed that only 18% of battering incidents resulted in arrest even
though officers were required to follow a mandatory arrest policy.99
c. Enforcement Issues-Protective Orders
Protective orders likewise have failed to protect women from abusers because
of enforcement problems. "In several well-publicized cases, women who had
obtained civil protection orders in court were then murdered by the same men who
had been ordered to stay away from them, because of inadequate police enforcement
and judges' unwillingness to jail men for violating such orders."'" The criteria and
frequency of issuing protective orders has often proved burdensome for women,
especially those who are economically disadvantaged or illiterate. Critics against
issuing protective orders argue they only increase the potential for violence rather
93. Id. at 136. The findings further indicated that "calling the police in itself acts as a deterrent to repeated abuse."
Id. at 137. Some opponents of mandatory arrest laws claim that innocent men will be arrested because women will lie
to have their husbands arrested. See id. at 137-38. Arrests are not always listed on a perpetrator's permanent record
so this risk is low; additionally, there are already measures in place to penalize persons from filing false claims. See
id. at 138. Some opponents fear that women will suffer more if the abuser is arrested and advocate more empowering
measures. See id. at 135. women rarely lie to get their significant others arrested. See id. at 138. In fact they usually
oppose it for fear of being beaten worse later. See id.
94. See FELDER&VICTOR,supra note 62, at 136-37.
95. Id. at 137.
96. See id.
97. See Neal Miller, Domestic Violence Legislation Affecting Police and Prosecutor Responsibilities in the
United States: Inferencesfrom a 50-State Review of State Statutory Codes and Exhibit 2: Police WarrantlessArrest
Authority: Domestic Violence and Order Violations (last modified June 30, 1997, updated August 1998)
<http://www.ilj.org/dv/DVVAW.html>.
98. Consider California's mandatory arrest law that was in effect ivhen Nicole Brown Simpson called the police and
was found "wearing only sweat pants and a bra, with bruises all over her face and hand prints on her neck." FELDER
& VICTOR, supra note 62, at 139-40; TOOBIN, supra note 61, at 52. The police did not arrest OJ. Simpson. See id. at
263; see also FELDER & VICTOR, supra note 62, at 139-40. Washington, D.C. has a mandatory arrest policy, but the
D.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence reported that "arrests were made in only 5% of all cases, and less than 15%
of cases" in which victims sustained wounds requiring medical attention. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 38-39 (1990). Of
19,000 domestic violence calls received by the District of Columbia Police Department in 1986, "42 of these incidents
resulted in a written police report, and possibly even fewer resulted in the arrest" of an offender. Violence Against
Women, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice ofthe House Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong.
98 (1992) (testimony of Sandra Sands citing report of District of Columbia Coalition Against Domestic Violence).
99. See Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, Irreconcilable Differences: Battered Women, Police, and the Law,
in LEGALRE sONSESrOWIFEAsSAULT, at 109-10 (1993).
100. Women and Violence Part 1, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 66 (1990)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings Part 1, 101-939] (statement of Helen R. Neubome, Executive Director, NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund).
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than curb it. °t In a DOJ study, "researchers concluded that restraining orders were
'ineffective in stopping physical violence'; however, they noted that protective orders
were "helpful in cases in which there was no history of violen[ce]."' 2 Another DOJ
study found that women who sought protective orders continued to have problems and
reported both physical and psychological abuse within six months of the protective
order being issued.1 3 Regardless until the passage of VAWA, protective orders
generally were not honored outside the state from which they were issued.' 4 Even
if protection orders were issued, problems arose because many times they conflicted
with visitation and custody orders.' 05
d. Unequal Sentencing Guidelines
Ironically, while law enforcement and the judiciary have been unable to
successfully arrest, prosecute, and convict abusers, they have had no difficulty in
vehemently prosecuting women who kill their abusers (usually in self defense).' 16
Women who kill their abusers receive an average prison sentence between 12 and 16
years; men who kill their significant others typically receive an average prison
sentence between 2 and 6 years.0" While several law review articles and books have
been dedicated solely to this topic, it is mentioned here to further illustrate the
inequity women face in the legal system, thus crystallizing the need for § 13981.
State efforts to eradicate domestic violence and rape have proven to be
completely ineffective and costly both in human life and dollars. What has escaped
national notice is the pervasive impact violence against women has economically and
socially on the United States as a whole. This economic drain was in part the impetus
for the ultimate passage of VAWA.
C. The Economic Impact of Violence Against Women
The economic effects of violence against women go beyond impacting individual
101. See DEBECKER, supra note 72, at 186.
102. Id. at 187.
103. See id. at 188. This has lead to the conclusion among some that "the short-term benefits of restraining orders
are greater than the long-term benefits." Id.
104. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Symposium on Domestic Violence: Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HoFSTRA L.REv. 801, 1099 (1993). Prior to
VAWA, only "[s]ix states ha[d] provisions in their civil protection order statutes... authoriz[ing] their courts to give
full faith and credit to the laws and orders of other state courts." Id.
105. See generally id.
106. See generally ANo-ABRwNE WEN BATrEDWoMENMKLL (1987); CHARLEs PATRICKEWING, BATTERED
WOMEN WHO KILL PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987); ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL
(1980); Phyliss L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV.
WomN's L.J. 121 (1985).
107. See Arlington Co. Victims of Violence, supra note 63; see also National Clearinghouse for the Defense of
Battered Women, StatisticsPacket 15 (3d ed. 1994) (on file with author); FELDER &VICTOR, supra note 62, at 175-76.
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women to include businesses and governments at all levels. The effects of violence
on the nation are apparent in productivity, consumption, and the overall health of the
economy. The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded: "Gender-based crimes and
the fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement, reduces employment
opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of
which affect interstate commerce and the national economy."' ' Estimates reveal
violence against women costs the United States three billion dollars a year. 9
Violence against women significantly affects the bottom line in businesses.
"The U.S. Justice Department estimates that, in 60,000 incidents of on-the-job
violence each year, the victims know their attackers intimately." ''1  According to a
recent U.S. Department of Labor study, homicide is "the most frequent manner in
which women workers are fatally injured at work;" additionally, the "study showed
that in 17% of these homicides, the alleged assailants were current or former
husbands or boyfriends.' '. Statistically women who are abused or suffer sexual
assault are more likely to be less productive in the work place and have a higher rate
of absenteeism." 2 These costs can be directly attributed to increased medical and
insurance expenditures for companies." 3 According to a 1994 study of Fortune
1,000 executives, 44% of those surveyed reported that "domestic violence...
increase[d] insurance and medical costs." ' 4 Because domestic violence is a cyclical
problem, these expenses continue to accrue over the long term. A National Family
Violence survey found that women who are abused have "twice as many headaches,
four times the rate of depression, and five and a half times more suicide attempts"
' 15
than women who are not abused. Domestic violence alone "has been estimated to
cost employers between 3 to 5 billion dollars annually due to absenteeism in the
workplace."" 6 This does not include medical costs which have been estimated at
108. S.REP.No. 102-197, at53 (1991).
109. See 5.R'.No. 101-545, at33 (1990).
110. Esta Solar, Domestic Violence: A Pressing Workplace Issue (visited Oct. 7, 1998)
<http://www.igc.apc.org/fund/workplace/wrkplacesta.html>.
Ill. Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Impact ofDomestic Violence on the Workplace Fact Sheet(visited Oct.
7, 1998) <http:llwww.igc.apc.orglfundlthe.facts/factsht.html> [hereinafter Family Violence Prevention Fund, The
Impact of Domestic Violence] (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women's Bureau, "Domestic Violence: A Workplace
Issue," in Facts on Working Women, No. 96-3, Oct. 1996, citing "Fatal Workplace Injuries in 1994: A Collection of
Data and Analysis," Report 908, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of Labor, July 1996).
112. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, 57 Percent of Corporate Leaders Believe Domestic Violence Is a
Major Social Problem According to Survey by Liz Claiborne, Inc., (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.igc.apc.-
org/fund/the_facts/claibome.html> [hereinafter Family Violence Prevention Fund, Liz Claiborne Survey]. A survey
of Fortune 1,000 company corporate executives reported that "domestic violence has had a harmful effect on their
company's 'productivity (49%),' 'attendance' (47%) and 'health care costs (44%).' Id. Further "[i]n a New York
study of 50 battered women, 75% said they had been harassed by the batterer while they were at work, 54% reported
missing an average of three days per month, and 44% lost at least one job for reasons directly related to the abuse."
Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 111 (citing Lucy Friedman & Sarah
Cooper, The Cost of Domestic Violence, Victim Services Research Department, 1987).
113. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note Ill (citing Women's
Work Program, Liz Claibome, Inc., Survey Conducted by Roper Starch Worldwide, New York, Liz Claiborne, Inc.,
July 18-Aug. 5, 1994).
114. Id.
115. S. REP. No. 102-369, at 240 (1991).
116. Id.
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close to $100 million dollars annually." 7 Additionally, victims of domestic violence
are often harassed in their work place, "prevented from arriving to work on time, and
kept from attending work altogether because of serious injuries.""'8
Finally, "violence against women also has a negative effect on levels of
commercial consumption."" 9 The idea is simple: "Women who cannot traverse
public streets without fear will also not use places of public accommodation,
purchase goods, or conduct business in such areas.' 0 "Fear of gender-motivated
violence restricts the hours during which women can engage in a variety of activities
and seriously curtails their participation in the commerce of our nation."'' With
women representing such a large part of the American workforce and of American
consumers and producers, the effect violence against women has on the national
economy cannot be ignored. 22
II. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN Acr
A. Legislative History of the Act
The Violence Against Women Act was "enacted as part of the 1994 omnibus
117. See id.
118. Shargel, supra note 25, at 1854.
119. Id. at 1855.
120. Id. (quoting statement of James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice's
Civil Rights Division at the Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearings on H.R. 1133 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 109 (1993)).
121. Id.
122. See id. In recognizing the economic drain of violence against women in both dollars and human lives, several
companies are proactively seeking to curb violence by implementing large-scalepublic awareness programs. To that
end," 19 corporations, trade associations, and unions collaborated to establish the National Workplace ResourceCenter
on Domestic Violence." Family Violence Prevention Fund, About the National Workplace Resource Center on
Domestic Violence (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.igc.apc.org/fund/workplace- about.htmi>. Entities involved in
the Center include: "Aetna Inc., American Council of Life Insurance, American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, Bank of America, Bechtel, Food Marketing Institute, Kaiser Permanente, Levi Strauss
Foundation, Liz Claiborne, Marshalls, Mintz, Levin, National Association of Manufacturers, Polaroid, Reebok,Service
Employees International Union, The Body Shop, The Gap, and Wells Fargo Bank." Id. Liz Claiborne and Marshalls
are pioneers in bringing corporate responsibility to this issue. In addition to creating Public Service Announcements
("PSAs") geared to educate men about violence issues, Liz Claiborne, Inc. contracted with Roper Starch Worldwide
to conduct an extensive survey among Fortune 1,000 executives to ascertain the effect of domestic violence in corporate
America. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, Liz Claiborne Develops New PSAs That Target Men (visited Oct.
7, 1998) <http://www.ig.apc.orgfund- materialstspeakup/LizNewPsa.htm>; see also Family Violence Prevention
Fund, New Liz Claiborne PSA Campaign Uses High Profile College Football Student Atheletes to Reposition
Relationship Violence as a Men's Issue (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.igc.apc.org/fund/men/sports2.html>;
Family Violence Prevention Fund, Liz Claiborne Survey, supra note 112. Additionally, Marshalls president, Jerome
R. Rossi, has been vocal in his desire to eradicate domestic violence. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, Creating
a Workplace Response to Domestic Violence (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.igc.apc.org/fund/workplace/
intro.html>. Rossi stated, "Families in America are in trouble... We [Marshalls] want to lend our name and our
leadership to this cause-to bring an end to this national epidemic." Id. To that end, Marshalls and the Family
Violence Prevention Fund created the Domestic Peace Prize program to recognize domestic violence prevention
programs. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, How One Company Has Responded: Marshalls, Inc. Creates
Awards Program (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.igc.apc.org/fund/- workplacelmarshalls.html>; see also Family
Violence Prevention Fund, Violence At Home Has Effect on the Workplace (visited Oct. 7, 1998)
<http://www.igc.apc.org/fundworkplacehome.html>; Family ViolencePrevention Fund, 'Oprah' Looks at the lmpact
of Domestic Violence at the Workplace (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.igc.apc.org/fund/celebrity/oprah.html>.
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crime bill, which authorized $1.67 billion in funding over six years for a variety of
programs that included women's shelters, a domestic abuse hotline, rape education
and prevention programs, and training for federal judges" to be executed through the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Health and Human Services ("HHS"). 23 Senator
Joseph Biden (D-DE) introduced the Violence Against Women Act (S. 2754) on June
19, 1990.124 Originally, VAWA included three main titles: prosecution and law
enforcement (Title I); battering and the criminalization of interstate battery (Title II);
and a new civil rights remedy (Title 1I).125 While the entire Act went through many
changes during its legislative ride to enactment, this comment focuses exclusively on
the legislative history pertaining to the civil rights provision. The-civil rights remedy,
Title Ell of S. 2754, incorporated language of and was fashioned with respect to other
civil rights remedies. 26 Title Ill defined substantive rights to be protected as the right
"to be free from crimes of violence overwhelmingly motivated by the victim's gender"
which included "any rape, sexual assault, or abusive contact motivated by gender."'
127
Congressional hearings and committees found that Title I was justified under
three rationales. First, gender-motivated crimes violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the victim's right to be free from "discrimination
on the basis of gender."' 2 Second, Congress recognized that current civil rights
remedies only provided relief for "gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not
for gender crimes committed on the street or in the home."'2 9 Finally, Congress found
that state and federal laws "d[id] not adequately protect against the bias element of
gender crimes, which separate[d] these crimes from acts of random violence, nor d[id]
they adequately provide victims the opportunity to vindicate their interests." 30
Title mH was initially modeled after contemporary civil rights remedies using
similar language and statutory construction like that found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, and 1985(3).'13  "Although existing civil rights remedies appear to be the
templates from which drafters copied the formal 'cause of action' under Title HI,
those remedies provide no analogue for the substantive right created by Title I 'to
be free' from gender-motivated violence."' 32 The civil rights remedies outlined in §§
1981, 1983 and 1985 do not specifically address the question of violence against
women, but rather were created to address racially-motivated violence.' 33 Section
1981 is expressly directed toward non-whites to ensure equal protection and the
benefit of the law in terms of enforcing contracts, the ability to sue and be sued, and
123. Patricia Schroeder, Stopping ViolenceAgainst Women Still TakesaFight: IflnDoubt, JustLookatthe 104th
Congress, 4 J.L. &POL'Y 377-98 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
124. See Nourse, supra note 4, at 7.
125. See id.
126. See S.REP.No. 101-545,at51 (1990).
127. S. 2754, § 301 (b) and (d), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 23 (1990).
128. Id. § 301(a), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 23 (1990).
129. Id. § 301(a)(2), reprinted in S. REP. No. 10 1-545, at 23 (1990).
130. Id. § 301(a)(3), reprinted in S. REP. No. 101-545, at 23 (1990).
131. See id. § 301 (a)(3), reprinted in S. RE'. No. 101-545, at 23 (1990).
132. Nourse, supra note 4, at 8.
133. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980) (stating that the main goal of § 1983 "was to override the
corrupting influence of the Ku Klux Klan").
1999]
17
Cain: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence against Women Act: Its
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
to give evidence.'34 Section 1983 provides federal redress for any violations involving
federal constitutional or statutory rights. 35 Finally, § 1985 addresses violent actions,
but only allows redress for perpetrators who have conspired to deprive a victim of
equal protection under the law. 36 Hence, the civil rights remedies (prior to § 1398 1)
were inadequate in addressing gender-motivated crimes. More importantly, none of
these statutes allowed redress for violence committed in the home.'
37
Though the obvious foundational requirements existed to warrant the creation
of a civil rights remedy, the Violence Against Women Act did not have an easy
passage through Congress. After Sen. Biden introduced S. 2754 in 1990, three
hearings were held during the 10 1st Congress.'38 The hearings provided a forum for
victims, policy makers, social service workers, politicians, and law enforcement to
detail the acute need for the Violence Against Women Act and in particular the civil
rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes. The hearings crystallized the
deficiency of the legal mechanisms in place for victims of gender violence.
Following the hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee met in October to
discuss VAWA.'39 It was at this time that Sen. Biden offered a new version of
.VAWA with substantive changes to Title Ii. 4 In particular the updated version
expanded Title III to include any crime of violence; initially it covered only sex
crimes.' 4 ' Another major change was the incorporation of language that required the
crime to be "overwhelmingly" gender motivated. 42 Following these changes, no more
action was taken in reference to S. 2754 during the 101st Congress.
At the beginning of the 102d Congress, Sen. Biden reintroduced VAWA as S.
15 with co-sponsor Rep. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) introducing it in the House. 143 With
its reintroduction, a massive battle was waged against the civil rights provision of
VAWA calling into question its constitutional foundation.'" Despite its opposition,
the civil rights provision and VAWA survived the 102d Congress essentially intact.
However, Sen. Biden made three changes to Title I1: (1) he added additional findings
of the Senate hearings to buttress the constitutional foundation of the remedy;' 45 (2)
he deleted the "presumption that sexual crimes were gender-motivated crimes" from
134. See42U.S.C.§ 1981(a) (1994).
135. See id.§ 1983.
136. See id.§ 1985.
137. See id. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985.
138. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35 (1991). See generally Senate Hearings Part 1, 101-939, supra note 100;
Women and Violence Part 2, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1 st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings Part 2, 101-939].
139. SeeS. RP. No. 101-545, at 29-30(1990).
140. See id.
141. See S. 2754, § 30 1(d), reprinted in S. REP. No. 10 1-545, at 23 (1990).
142. Id. § 301 (b), reprinted in S. RE'. No. 101-545, at 23 (1990).
143. SeeS.RE.No. 102-197, at35 (1991).
144. Several groups, including proninent administrators in the Bush administration, contended that the civil rights
provision was unconstitutional and launched a massive negative campaign to strike the measure entirely. See Nourse,
supra note 4, at 16, 18 ("ChiefJustice Rehnquist gave a widely publicized 1991 year-end report, in which he urged
'self-restraint in adding new federal causes of action "', reprinted in 138 CONG. REc. S443-44 (daily cd. Jan. 27,
1992)). Additionally, "the Bush Justice Department had opined that the bill was unconstitutional for a number of
reasons." Id. at 18. The specifics ofthis controversy are discussed infra Part I.B.
145. See Nourse, supra note 4, at 25.
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the bill; " and (3) he deleted the requirement that a "defendant's conduct" must be
"'overwhelmingly' motivated by gender."' 47
During the 103d Congress, VAWA was reintroduced by Senators Biden and
Boxer as S. 11, and a companion bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Patricia
Schroeder (D-CO) as H.R. 1133."4 S. 11 was faced with competition when Sen.
Hatch (R-PA) introduced S. 6 which incorporated some of Sen. Dole's (R-KS)
SexualAssault Violence Prevention Act. 49 In May 1993, Senators Hatch and Biden
agreed to construct a compromise piece of legislation. 50 Three important changes
were made to VAWA by the Senate in late 1993. The first was procedural in nature;
Title I was amended to specifically set forth concurrent jurisdiction of federal and
state courts and limited removal jurisdiction.' 5 1 Additionally, Title III was amended
to restrict the federal court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims dealing
with divorce, child custody, alimony, and property settlements.152 The second change
limited the kinds of claims that could be heard under § 13981 to felonies that included
a risk of personal injury. 153 The final change sought to clarify the statutory meaning
of "motivated by gender."' 54 After much discussion, the language was amended to
require a showing that the act was committed because of gender and due in part to an
"animus based on the victim's gender."'55 After these changes, VAWA was passed
by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton on September 13, 1994 as Title
IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.156
B. Opponents of§ 13981
From its inception, § 13981 (formerly Title III) faced deep resistance and
suspicion. Two weeks after its introduction into the 102d Congress, the Conference
of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts expressed its opposition to Title I11 on the
grounds that it would flood the federal docket with domestic disputes. 57 Vincent L.
McKusick, Chief Justice of Maine's Supreme Judicial Court, "questioned the need
for 'direct federal intervention into the tangled and tragic cases involving family
breakdown and violence."",158 In addition, other Chief Justices expressed "concern"
over women using the provision as a bargaining chip in divorce proceedings:
146. Id.
147. S.REP.No. 102-197,at51 (1991).
148. See Nourse, supra note 4, at 26.
149. See id. at n.141.
150. See id. at 26.
151. See S. 11, § 302(e)(3), (5), reprinted in S. REP. No. 101-138, at 30 (1990).
152. See id. § 302(e)(4), reprinted in S. REP. No. 101-138, at 30 (1990).
153. See id. § 302(d)(2)(A), reprinted in S. REP. No. 101-138, at 30(1990). A felony is generally defined as an
offense that carries a sentence of death or imprisonment of one year or more. See LAFAvE, supra note 36, at 818.
154. S.REP.NO. 101-138,at 50(1990).
155. S. 11, § 302(d)(1), reprinted in S. REP.NO. 101-138,at 30 (1990).
156. Pub. L. No. 103-322,108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
157. See Victims of the System Hearings 102-369, supra note 19, at 314-17.
158. Rode Sherman, Fears Expressed On Proposed Bill To Aid Women, Tim NAT'LLJ., June 3, 199 1, at 16.
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Because the provision on gender-based violence appears to permit civil suits
against husbands, the state judges warn, "this right will be invoked as a
bargaining tool within the context of divorce negotiations and add a major
complicating factor to an environment which is often acrimonious as it is."' 1 9
United States Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist was also a vocal opponent
of the provision fearing it would flood an already bulging federal docket. 61 Chief
Justice Rehnquist opposed the provision because its "definition of a new crime [was]
so open-ended and the new private right of action so sweeping, that the legislation
could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic disputes."'' These
concerns were ultimately addressed in § 13981 procedural provisions specifically
restricting federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction over any claim seeking the
"establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or
child custody decree."'
62
Judicial opponents justified their criticisms under the guise of protecting the
federal judiciary and maintaining deference to state sovereignty. However, the
reluctance stemmed most likely from the federal judiciary's sense that such matters
were below them.163 "This view of domestic relations as trivial and local translates
into related contexts involving women, such as gender-based violence."' 64 The
opposition to § 13981 is derived from an inability to acknowledge that gender-
motivated crimes (e.g., rape and domestic violence) are systemic problems deserving
of federal relief. "This is problematic because it fails to recognize that such issues
can and often do implicate national concerns regulable under the federal government's
enumerated powers."'6 With such a response, the judiciary is essentially restricting
a woman's "access to federal court solely... on the ground that her assailant is not
a stranger to her.' ' 6
6
In addition to judicial adversaries, the American Bar Association ("ABA") and
the DOJ were staunch opponents of § 13981. In particular, the constitutionality was
hotly debated, especially by the DOJ. In a letter to Sen. Biden, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Bruce Navarro wrote:
[W]e cannot support the creation of a duplicative federal damage remedy,
particularly without a showing that current state remedies are inadequate. We also
have serious concerns about the open-ended draftsmanship of the section and the
doubtful constitutional basis for the bill's cause of action insofar as it covers
159. Ann Pelnam & Gary Sturgess, Domestic Relations in Federal Court?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at 7
(emphasis added).
160. See id.
161. 138 CONG. REc. S443,444 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994).
163. See Maloney, supra note 41, at 1899 (footnote omitted).
164. Id.
165. Id. (footnote omitted).
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underlying acts that were not taken under color of state law.67
Considering the dearth of information solicited by the Senate hearings and
committees, Navarro's comments are almost comical. Clearly from the evidence
adduced at the hearings, state laws were proven insufficient in prosecuting and
curbing gender-motivated violence.' 6 The color of law violation Navarro suggested
was also moot. Section 13981 does not allow any claim against a governmental
entity that did not already exist under § 1983.'69 Section 13981 "permits claims
against governmental entities only where a governmental entity could be sued under
§ 1983."17°
Navarro's constitutional concerns were hollow as well, but in lieu of Lopez they
have been called into question. In order to understand the impact of Lopez on the
contemporary view of the Commerce Clause, it is necessary to consider the Court's
treatment of the Commerce Clause over the last sixty years. The following section
provides a brief historical overview of the Commerce Clause leading up to Lopez.
C. History of the Modern Commerce Clause View
Section 13981 was passed under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment. The constitutionality of § 13981 was addressed in detail in the Senate
hearings. 7' Consistently, constitutional scholars upheld Congress's authority to pass
§ 13981 under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 Historically,
the Supreme Court had upheld Congress's authority to enact civil rights remedies as
well as a host of other general welfare statutes on the basis of the Commerce
Clause. 73
For over sixty years, the Court has endorsed congressional power to pass
legislation that had even a minimum effect on the Commerce Clause. 74 The
Commerce Clause grants Congress three broad categories of activity which it has the
power to regulate: (1) "the use of channels of interstate commerce"; (2) "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce";
167. Letter from Bruce Navarro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Sen. Joseph S. Biden (Oct. 1990) (on file
with author).
168. For an overview, see supra Part I.
169. See S.REP. No. 102-197, at 51-52 (1991).
170. Id.
171. See Victims ofthe System Hearings 102-369, supra note 19, at 84-134 (statements of Prof. Burt Neubourne
and Prof. Cass Sustein testifying on the constitutionality of Title 111).
172. See id.
173. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964). The Lopez Court acknowledged that it had "upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate
economic activity ... that... substantially affected interstate commerce ... includ[ing] regulation of intrastate coal
mining; intrastate extortionate credit transactions; restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies; inns and hotels
catering to interstate guests; and production and consumption of home-grown wheat." (citations omitted). United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,559-60 (1995).
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I
and (3) "those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."'75 The
modem, expansive view of the Commerce Clause began during the post-New Deal
era with NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.76 This case established the
contemporary standard allowing government regulation of any activity having a
"substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce.'77 In the cases that followed,
"the Court made clear that 'economic effect' as used in Jones & Laughlin mean[t]
the aggregate economic effect of the entire class of regulated behavior, as opposed
to the effect of the single transaction before the Court."'78
This generous and liberal approach to the Commerce Clause continued in
United States v. Darby when the Court upheld the National Fair Labor Standards
Act. 7 9 The Act sought to prohibit the sale of goods across state lines that had been
produced under conditions that violated federal law.80 The Court in upholding the
Act represented a break away from the more traditional approach to the Commerce
Clause, that of considering whether the activity in question was local or national in
nature."' The Court held Congress could regulate local business conditions if the
goods being produced would eventually enter interstate commerce.'82
In Wickard v. Filburn, this standard was taken to an extreme when the Court
held that wheat quotas established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act ("AAA") were
constitutional to regulate the consumption of a single farm.'83 The Court upheld the
national regulation of a local activity:
It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-
consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market
conditions. This may arise because being in marketable condition such wheat
overhangs the market... But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a
need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in
the open market."8
With the Wickard decision, the Court held that Congress could consider local
activities in the aggregate in its decision to regulate them.
Under this permissive view, Congress embarked on enacting a host of legislation
geared at ending racial discrimination predicated on the idea that discrimination
affected. interstate commerce. Congress enacted Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which prohibited racial discrimination in public places such as hotels and
175. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
176. 301 U.S. 1,57 (1937).
177. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-38.
178. Victims of the System Hearings 102-369, supra note 19, at 96 (testimony of Prof. Burt Neubourne on the
constitutionality of Title III) (emphasis added).
179. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
180. See id.at 109.
181. See id.at 115-17.
182. See id. at 123.
183. See Wickardv.Filbum,317 U.S. 111 (1942).
184. Id. at 128.
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restaurants.' 85 Title II was challenged in Heart ofAtlanta v. United States, a case
involving a motel which refused to serve black patrons. 8 6 In Heart of Atlanta, the
Court established a two-part inquiry in Commerce Clause legislation: (1) whether
there is a rational basis for the regulation of intrastate activities; and (2) whether the
means are appropriate and reasonable.187 In upholding Title II, the Court rejected the
hotel's argument that its operations were purely local: "It is said that the operation
of the motel here is of a purely local character. But, assuming this to be true, '[i]f it
is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze.
' ' '188
A companion case to Heart ofAtlanta, Katzenbach v. McClung, also sustained
a constitutional challenge to Title 11.189 McClung, similar to Heart of Atlanta,
involved a restaurant which refused to serve black patrons.' 90 The Court applied the
rational basis test, holding that refusing to serve blacks could result in "established
restaurants ... s[elling] less interstate goods because of the discrimination...
[because] interstate travel was obstructed directly by it, that business in general
suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing there as a
result."' 9 ' This expansive view of the Commerce Clause granted Congress broad
authority to pass mountains of general welfare legislation. Critics of the Court's
liberal rationale warned that under such a view anything could be regulated,
ultimately usurping all state sovereignty. 92
It may have been this fear that proved as a catalyst for the decision handed
down in United States v. Lopez in which the Court refused to uphold the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 which made gun possession in a school zone a federal
crime.'93 The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce. 94 Additionally, the Court rejected
arguments that gun possession affected interstate commerce as too tenuous and
requiring a leap of faith the Court was unwilling to take. 95 The Court went on to
posit, "[t]o uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained
by the States."'196 This decision represented a dramatic departure from the Court's
185. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(h)(6) (1994).
186. See Heart of Atlanta v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
187. See id. at 258-59.
188. Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
189. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
190. See id. at 296-97.
191. Id. at 300.
192. See NORMAN RED11CH Er AL, CONSmITrONAL LAW 122 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Chief Justice Hughes in
Schelter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)) ("If the commerce clause were construed to reach all
enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal
authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic
concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government.").
193. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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permissive and indulgent Commerce Clause rationale.
Understandably, the Lopez decision has raised constitutional questions about
legislation passed under the liberal Commerce Clause view. Pertinent to this
comment, Lopez directly affects the constitutionality of § 13981 since its
constitutionality is firmly rooted in a liberal Commerce Clause view. Lopez has
produced conflicting results with respect to the Commerce Clause, evidenced by the
outcomes in the first two cases to challenge the constitutionality of § 13981.'97
III. CASES LITIGATED UNDER § 13981
A. Doe v. Doe'
In Doe v. Doe, Plaintiff Jane Doe sought "to avail herself of the civil rights
remedy provided under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994... for deprivation
of her federal right to be free from her husband's alleged gender-based violence."'199
Jane Doe claimed that between 1978 and 1995 her husband "'systematically and
continuously inflicted a violent pattern of physical and mental abuse and cruelty"'
upon her by "throwing her to the floor, kicking her, throwing sharp and dangerous
objects at her, threatening to kill her, and destroying property belonging to [her]."' "'
Additionally, Jane Doe claimed she was forced "'to be a 'slave' and perform all
manual labor, including maintaining and laying out his clothes for his numerous dates
with his many girlfriends and mistresses.'" 20' Defendant, John Doe, moved to dismiss
on the basis that Congress "lacked authority under either the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to enact" § 13981.201
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), the government intervened and "argue[d] in support
of the constitutionality" of § 1398 1.23
Doe v. Doe was the first case to challenge the constitutionality of § 13981.
After reviewing "VAWA statutory language, legislative history, and briefing of the
parties," the court held the defendant's "claims of unconstitutionality [were]
unfounded." ' The court recognized that a rational basis existed for "concluding that
197. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935
F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996). Interestingly, several statutes have been challenged in the wake of Lopez, but to date
"not a single one has been invalidated by a federal appellate court." Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 132.F.3d 949, 969 n.13 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 582-88 (4th Cir. 1997)
(upholding FACE); EPA v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506,1509-10 (11 th Cir. 1997) (upholding CERCLA); United States
v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 700-01 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding Drug Free School-Zones Act); United States v. Bramble,
103 F.3d 1475,1479-82 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d
142, 144-46 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Indian Major Crimes Act)). An overview of each court's determination
of the constitutionality of § 13981 is discussed infra Part III.
198. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
199. Id. at 610.
200. Id. (quoting, in part, Complaint '12).
201. Id. (quoting Complaint 127).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,610 (D. Conn. 1996).
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gender-based violence.., is a national problem with substantial impact on interstate
commerce and thus is a proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause."2 5 In making its decision, the court first considered that "Congress held
numerous hearings over a four-year period and amassed substantial documentation
on how gender-based violence impacts interstate commerce and interferes with
women's ability to enjoy equal protection of the laws." '
The defendant's argument against the constitutionality of § 13981 was based
upon the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez. The defendant argued
that Congress exceeded its authority in creating VAWA because it "create[d] a
'plenary federal police power,' outside the Constitution's rubric which 'creates a
Federal Governiiient of enumerated powers,"' and that VAWA "impermissibly
encroache[d] on the states' separate and distinct powers under the Tenth
Amendment.' '207 The defendant interpreted Lopez as overruling "the rationality test
for determining whether federal regulation of interstate conduct can be sustained."20
The court held that while "Lopez does warn that the Commerce Clause has limits,"
the Supreme Court "reaffirmed the rationality test of Hodel."2 9
The court distinguished the Violence Against Women Act from the Gun-Free
School Zones Act: "The Congressional findings and reports qualitatively and
quantitatively demonstrate the substantial effect on interstate commerce of gender-
based violence, in marked distinction to the Gun-Free Zone Act challenged in Lopez
which lacked such analysis, only theoretical impact arguments." 2'0 Finally, in
upholding the constitutionality of § 13981 the court conceded that "[w]hile Supreme
Court precedent does not articulate a particular standard or test to determine whether
a particular activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce, Wickard v. Filburn,
is instructive as setting forth the outer limit of Congress's authority to regulate
private intra-state conduct."2'' The court reasoned:
repetitive nationwide impact of women withholding, withdrawing or limiting their
participation in the workplace or marketplace in response to or as a result of
gender-based violence.., is of such a nature to be as substantial an impact on
interstate commerce as the effect of excess 'home-grown' wheat harvesting which
was found to have been properly regulated by Congressional enactment."
Additionally, the court found no merit in the defendant's argument that § 13981
205. Id.
206. Id. at 611 (paraphrasingtheresultsofDomestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, 101st Cong. 2 (1990)); see
also Women and Violence, 101st Cong. 7 (1990); Victims ofthe System Hearings 102-369, supra note 19; Violence
Against Women, Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102d Cong. (1992).
207. Id. at 612 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (citing THEFEDmAUsTNO. 45, at 292-93
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
208. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,613 (D. Conn. 1996) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,276 (1981).
209. Id. at 613.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
212. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,303 (1964)).
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"encroaches on traditional police powers of the state," thus "'federaliz[ing]' criminal,
family law, and state tort law."213 The court recognized that VAWA "does nothing
to infringe on a state's authority to arrest and prosecute an alleged batterer on
applicable criminal charges."214 The court held that VAWA did not invade state law,
but rather supplemented state law by:
recognizing a societal interest in ensuring that persons have a civil right to be free
from gender-based violence, and through the Civil Rights Remedy, makes
operative the Act's remedial and deterrent purposes, by making violators of this
right personally answerable to the victims in compensatory and punitive
damages.215
Further, the court found the defendant's contention moot since the express language
of the statute prohibits federal supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving
divorce, alimony, or custody issues.216
In conclusion, the court found that the statute was reasonably adapted to its
intended purpose because the congressional hearings and committees had proven that
current federal and state law was inadequate in addressing gender-based violence.21'
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the court reaffirmed that bias crimes are
"thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm... [because they] are more
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims,
and incite community unrest."2 8 To that end, the court held that the statutory scheme
was within Congress's Commerce Clause authority and "consistent with prior
precedent related to other federal civil rights remedies enacted by Congress and
upheld by courts as constitutional under the Commerce Clause." 9
While the constitutionality of § 13981 was upheld in Doe v. Doe, its
constitutionality was challenged again in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute
& State University.220 InBrzonkala, the court found the statute to be unconstitutional
as an excess of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment.22'
B. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Brzonkala involved the rape of a Virginia Polytechnic Institute ("VPI") female
213. Id. at 615-16.




218. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,487-88 (1993)).
219. Id. at 617.
220. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
221. See id. at 801. Because this comment deals exclusively with the effect of Lopez on the Commerce Clause, the
court's arguments in reference to the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX are not discussed.
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student by two male football players.222 Christy Brzonkala alleged that on September
21, 1994, "two men forced her to have sexual intercourse by threat and
intimidation."22 Brzonkala met her attackers in her dormitory room with another
female friend and after talking together for approximately fifteen minutes, the other
female left whereupon Antonio Morrison asked her to have sex with him two times.224
Both times she said "no." 225 "When she tried to leave, Morrison forced her on to a
bed, disrobed her, held her arms down at her elbows, pinned her legs with his knees,
and raped her., 22 6 The second attacker, James Crawford, then entered the room and
raped her while he held her down.22 7 After Crawford finished, Morrison raped
Brzonkala again and then stated, "[yl]ou better not have any fucking diseases"; neither
attacker used a condom.22 "In the months following the rape, Morrison announced
publicly in the dormitory dining room that he 'like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the
shit out of them." 229
Because Brzonkala only knew her attackers' first names, she was unable to
identify them. 3 Following the attack, she suffered severe depression, stopped
attending classes, and attempted suicide.23' Five months later in February of 1995,
Brzonkala identified Antonia Morrison and James Crawford as her attackers and in
April she filed a complaint with the university.232 Brzonkala decided not to file
criminal charges because she "believe[d] that criminal prosecution was impossible
because she had not preserved any physical evidence. ' '233 "Virginia Tech did not
report the rapes to the police, and did not urge Brzonkala to reconsider her decision
not to do so. ' In fact, rape is the "only violent felony that Virginia Tech authorities
do not automatically report to the university or town police." 235 In May 1995,
Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and suspended for two semesters, but
there was "insufficient evidence to take action against Crawford." 6 Morrison's
sanction was upheld on appeal. 23
7
A second hearing was granted on the grounds that Morrison's due process rights
had been violated; Morrison's charge was reduced to abusive conduct and he received
a two-semester suspension.3 In conducting the second hearing, Brzonkala was
"assured [by Dean of Students Cathryn T. Goree and a Virginia Tech administrator]
222. See id. at 781-82.
223. Id. at 782.
224. See Security On Campus, Inc., Statement of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,JointAppendix 71 [hereinafterJoint
Appendix] (visited Nov. 30, 1997) <http://www.soconline.org/LEGALJBRZONKALA/1 1 1896.html>.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 71-72.
227. See id. at 72.
228. Id.
229. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997).
230. See Joint Appendix, supra note 224, at 7 1.
231. See id. at 73, Wl[26-27.
232. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,782 (W.D. Va. 1996).
233. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954.
234. See id. at 954.
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
237. See id.
238. See Brzonkala, 132 F. 3d at 954-55.
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that they believed her story, and that the second hearing was a mere technicality to
cure the school's error in bringing the first complaint under the Sexual Assault
Policy. ''239 However, these assurances did not ring true when in actuality the hearing
was "much more than a mere formality. ' 4  In addition to Brzonkala receiving
inadequate notice of the hearing, Virginia Tech "belatedly informed her that student
testimony given at the first hearing would not be admissible at the second hearing and
that if she wanted the second judicial committee to consider this testimony she would
have to submit affidavits or produce the witnesses.""24 Additionally, the school
denied Brzonkala and her attorney "access to the tape recordings of the first hearing,
while granting Morrison and his attorney complete and early access to those tapes. 242
Despite these inequities, the second judicial committee found Morrison guilty of
violating the Sexual Abuse Policy and imposed the same sanction.243 Morrison
appealed and "without notice to Brzonkala" Senior Vice President and Provost Peggy
Meszaros "set aside the sanction."2'
In the fall of 1995, Brzonkala learned from an article published in the
Washington Post that Morrison was returning to school (on a full athletic
scholarship) 45 and that his charge had been reduced from abusive conduct to "using
abusive language."246 Because Brzonkala feared for her personal safety and "because
of previous threats," she withdrew from VPI.247 In making the decision not to return
to school, Brzonkala stated she believed "Virginia Tech's actions signaled to
Morrison, as well as the student body as a whole, that the school... did not view
Morrison's conduct as improper." 2' In December 1995, Brzonkala instituted a §
13981 action and a Title IX action in federal court against Morrison, Crawford, and
VPI. 2 49
239. Id. at 954.
240. Id.
241. Id. at954-55.
242. Id. at 955.
243. See id. at 955.
244. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,782 (W.D. Va. 1996). In reviewing
the appeal, Provost Meszaros acknowledged a violation of Virginia Tech's Abusive Conduct Policy; however, she felt
that a two-semester suspension for the gang rape of a student was "excessive when compared" with similar cases.
Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955. Significantly, the Provost failed to identify the "other cases" to which she relied on in
suspending Morrison's sentence. Id. As a result, the Provost, "deferred suspension until [Morrison's] graduation from
Virginia Tech," thereby emasculating the penalty. Id.
245. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 955 (4th Cir. 1997).
246. See Joint Appendix, supra note 224, at 81-82, 1169-70.
247. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955.
248. Id.
249. Seeid. Most universities have established procedures and protocols fordealing with sexual assault on campus.
Some universities such as the University of Oklahoma (OU) in Norman, Oklahoma, have been very proactive in raising
awareness about sexual assault in addition to general campus crime. For instance, OU has a web site dedicated to crime
prevention and safety information linked to its university home page. Established in 1995, it was "one of the first law
enforcement sites in the nation." Joe Lester, Director, University of Oklahoma, Department of Public Safety, Welcome
to The Police Notebook (last modified Oct. 18, 1997) <http:Hwww.ou.edu/oupd/welcome.htm>. OU's site is
"recognized as one of the largest and finest public safety sites on the web." Id. In addition to hundreds of links, The
Police Notebook site has a page dedicated to Personal Safety outlining several educational web pages, including one
on sexual assault. See id. OU's sexual assault awareness program, Trust Your Instincts, was established in the late
S980s by OU administrators, students, and community organizations such as the Women's Resource Center, Inc. OU's
program ranges from an Escort Service for students studying late on campus to a public speaker program to raise
28
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The district court in declaring § 13981 unconstitutional relied primarily on
Lopez to sustain its contention that Congress had acted outside its Commerce Clause
authority in creating the civil rights remedy." The court found that the "effects-
analysis of the majority decision in Lopez can be broken down into four parts": (1)
"nature of the regulated activity"; (2) jurisdictional element requirement; (3)
legislative history; and (4) practical implications of the legislation." Under the first
element, the court interpreted Lopez as creating a demarcation between intrastate
activities that are economic in nature and those that are not. 52 The court concluded
"[a]fterLopez, cases such as Wickard, where regulated intrastate activity is economic
in nature, do not control cases where regulated intrastate activity is not economic.
' ' 53
Additionally, the court construed Lopez as requiring a jurisdictional element to test
the effect of each case on interstate commerce. 4  The court downplayed the
importance of congressional findings concluding that "such findings were not
necessary." '  Finally, the court interpreted Lopez as a warning that if congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause was not curtailed it would lead to governmental
regulation of traditional state areas (including family law and education). 56
The district court reasoned that § 922 of the Gun-Free School Zones Act and
§ 13981 of VAWA were so similar as to conclude, as the Supreme Court did in
Lopez, that § 13981 was unconstitutional. 7 The court first considered that § 13981
like § 922 was not "commercial or even economic in nature." 8 The court held that
under Lopez the economic nature of the activity was a valid consideration." The
court cited Doe v. Doe criticizing its reliance on Wickard in upholding the
constitutionality of § 13981 because "to analyze the commerce power in a case
involving a non-economic activity is not tenable."2 60
The court weighed heavily the fact that neither § 922 nor § 13981 had a
jurisdictional element requirement to serve as a gatekeeper to "limit[] each individual
case under VAWA to situations involving interstate commerce."2 6' The court
consciousness about safety issues on campus. See id. It is a point of personal pride for this author to have been an
original student involved in helping launch the Trust Your Instincts program. Perhaps not surprisingly, Virginia Tech's
homepage has one page dedicated to sexual assault prevention linked to its campus police site. See Virginia Tech Police
Department, Sexual AssaultlSex Offenses, (last modified Mar. 23, 1998) <http://ntserver.police.vt.edu/policel
sexual.htm>. In contrast, VPI's athletic program's page is linked directly to VPI's homepage and offers over 20 links
to sports related sites. See VirginiaTech Athletics, The OfficialAthletics Website of the Virginia Tech Hokies, (visited
Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.hokiesports.com/>. Finally, a Yahoo! search for Virginia Tech University finds over 20
sites to athletics alone, 8 of which are dedicated exclusively to football. See Yahoo! search engine (visited Oct. 12,
1998) (search conducted with the following search terms: U.S. States: Virginia: Cities: Blacksburg: Education: College
and University: Colleges and Universities: Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (Virginia Tech)).
250. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,801 (W.D. Va. 1996).
251. Id. at 786-87.




256. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,788 (W.D. Va. 1996).
257. See id. at 793.
258. Id. at 791.
259. See id.
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conceded that "[a]lthough it is unclear whether such a jurisdictional requirement is
needed... Congress has often placed such a requirement in legislation similar to
VAWA." '262 Finally, the court focused on the practical implications of upholding §
13981 under the Commerce Clause. The court noted that while the congressional
findings illustrate that violence against women has an effect on the national economy,
that alone "does not suffice to show that it has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."2 63 The court criticized Brzonkala of using "'effects on the national
economy' interchangeably with 'effects on interstate commerce."'2 64 This, the court
stated, is unequivocally "wrong. '"265 The court theorized that if Brzonkala's
interpretation was accepted, congressional authority "would extend to an unbounded
extreme." 266 The court was strongly influenced by the defendant's analogy that
insomnia and domestic violence annually cost the country approximately $15 billion
dollars each and under a liberal Commerce Clause rationale any activity could be
regulated.' 67 The court concluded that "to extend Congress's power to these issues
would unreasonably tip the balance away from the states. '268 The flaw in the court's
reliance on this analogy is that unlike domestic violence, insomnia is not a crime. The
court's notation that domestic violence and insomnia are equivalent in terms of
representing an economic drain on the national economy fails to take into account the
millions of dollars associated generally with violence against women (i.e., medical
and insurance costs, costs to businesses in terms of absenteeism and productivity, and
costs associated with sexual assault).
The court concluded because § 13981 did not involve an economic activity and
a jurisdictional requirement, enforcement would be an unlawful exercise of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment.269 As
a result, the court dismissed the federal action with prejudice and dismissed the state
actions without prejudice.27 Brzonkala appealed and a three-judge panel for the
Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments on June 4, 1997.27 Attorneys for VPI were
"showered... with pointed questions. 27 2 Judge J. Michael Luttig questioned why
VPI had continually "insisted on renaming 'rape' as 'abusive conduct' which he
considered "word-smithing."27 3 On December 23, 1997, the Fourth Circuit in a 2-1
ruling reversed the lower court's decision.274 In an analytical framework strikingly




266. Id. at 792-93.
267. See id. at 793.
268. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,793 (W.D. Va. 1996).
269. Seeid.at801.
270. See id.
271. See Security On Campus, Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals Hears OralArgument on Brzonkala v. Virginia Tech
(visited Nov. 30, 1997) <http:llwww.soconline.org/LEGALIBRZONKALA/060497.html>.
272. Id.
273. Id. Ironically, it was Judge Luttig who dissented vehemently in the Fourth Circuit's December 1997 decision
to overrule the district court. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
274. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 949.
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similar to the rationale relied on in Doe v. Doe, the Fourth Circuit determined that
Congress had not exceeded its authority under the commerce clause in enacting §
13981.275
The appellate court began by denying the defendants' assertion that Brzonkala
failed to state a claim under § 13981.276 The remainder of the court's analysis
focused on the constitutionality of § 13981.277 In this analysis, the court first
acknowledged that congressional acts are "entitled to a 'strong presumption of
validity and constitutionality.' 278 Further, the court recognized that its role in
determining "'whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the
Commerce Clause is relatively narrow.' 279 Looking to Lopez, the court recognized
that § 13981 involved a regulation of a non-economic activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.u °
In holding that § 13981 did not exceed congressional authority, the appellate
court compared § 922 of the Gun-Free School Zones Act with § 13981 of the
Violence Against Women Act.8' The court first noted in "contrast to the
congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous findings when it enacted
VAWA. ''282 To that end, the court found that it could "begin where the Lopez Court
could not, by 'evaluat[ing] the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce. '283 The court found that the
congressional hearings and findings spanning four years outlined in gross detail the
economic impact that violence against women has on the national economy. 4
Following such findings, the court surmised that its "task [wa]s simply to discern
whether Congress had 'a rational basis' for concluding that the regulated activity.
substantially 'affected interstate commerce."'" 5  The rational basis test has been
used by ten other circuits in testing "post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges. ' 26
The appellate court also weighed recent Fourth Circuit decisions involving post-
Lopez challenges. In particular the court outlined its decision in United States v.
Leshuk287 focusing on its reliance of congressional findings in upholding the
constitutionality of § 401(a)(1) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970.288 The court acknowledged that it "based [its] conclusion
wholly on Congress's 'detailed findings that intrastate manufacture, distribution, and
possession of controlled substances, as a class of activities, have a substantial and
275. See id. at 973-74. See generally Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
276. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 964.
277. See id. at 964-73.
278. Id. at 964 (quoting Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946,955 (4th Cir. 1984)).
279. Id. at 965 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,276 (1981)).
280. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949,965 (4th Cir. 1997).
281. See id. at 965-73.
282. Id. at 965.
283. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,563 (1995)).
284. See id. at 965-69.
285. Id. at 967 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
286. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 968 n.l I (4th Cir. 1997).
287. 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
288. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 968.
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direct effect upon interstate"' commerce.281 Additionally, the court considered an
earlier decision in which it relied upon congressional reports to sustain a
constitutional challenge to the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act ("FACE"). 2 90 The
court referred to its reliance on congressional reports by noting that it "determin[ed]
that those reports made 'clear' that 'several aspects of interstate commerce [were]
directly and substantially affected by the regulated conduct."' 2 9' BecausetheVAWA
congressional findings were more substantial than those relied upon in either Leshuk
or Hoffman, the court reasoned it had "no hesitation [in] similarly upholding
VAWA.292
Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that unlike § 922, VAWA did not infringe
upon traditional state powers.293 Instead, VAWA involved civil rights-an area
historically dominated by federal law.294 Additionally, the court found the
defendants' reliance on Lopez misguided. 95 In particular, the court rejected the
defendants' argument that Lopez required a jurisdictional element to withstand a
constitutional challenge.296 The court reasoned that "'[i]f a jurisdictional element
were critical . . . the Court in Lopez would not have gone on to examine the
Government's proffered rationales for the constitutionality of the gun possession
statute."'297 In reversing the district court's decision, the appellate court held that
"the core teaching of Lopez is simply that Congress must ensure that legislation
enacted pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority reaches only activities that
'substantially affect interstate commerce.'" 29'
The defendants appealed the Fourth Circuit's decision requesting a rehearing
en banc.299 In February 1998, the court agreed and vacated its December 1997
decision.300 The Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments on March 3, 1998, in
Richmond.30' While a decision is still pending at the time of this writing, the Fourth
Circuit is expected to affirm the district court's decision.3' Brzonkala's attorneys
believe "her lawsuit would make a good test case" for the Supreme Court °. 3  To
determine if creation of a civil rights remedy was warranted, Fourth Circuit judges
questioned Brzonkala's legal team about congressional authority in enacting VAWA
289. Id. (quoting United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105,1112 (4th Cir. 1995)).
290. See id.
291. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575,586-88 (4th Cir. 1997)).
292. Id.
293. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 970 (4th Cir. 1997)
294. See id. at 971.
295. See id. at 970.
296. See id. at 973.
297. Id. at 973 (quoting Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
298. Id. Judge Luttig dissented, echoing similar concerns outlined in the district court's decision. See id. Because
the Fourth Circuit's decision was ultimately vacated, Judge Luttig's dissent is not outlined in detail in this comment.




302. See Jan Vertefeuille, Appeals Court Scrutinizes Violence Against Women Act: Judges Question If Congress
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and about the effect of violence against women on interstate commerce. °4 Echoing
identical concerns from VAWA's legislative history, one judge asked, "If we have a




In the same vein, several judges warned that allowing a federal civil rights remedy
could result in a federal divorce or murder law.3t 6 In conclusion, Chief Judge Harvie
Wilkinson warned that "Congress is trying to usurp the 50 states' 'most basic power,
which is the police power.' 307
If the Fourth Circuit affirms the district court's holding, Brzonkala will be ripe
for the Supreme Court to clarify the issues raised by Lopez. Confusion stemming
from Lopez has caused numerous challenges to statutes passed under the Commerce
Clause.30 ' Although several constitutional arguments have been based upon a
Commerce Clause rationale, "not a single... [case] has been invalidated by a federal
appellate court."3' Should Brzonkala proceed to the Supreme Court, it is unlikely
the Court will grant Lopez such an expansive reading.
IV. ANALYSIS OF§ 13981 CASES
A. Why Lopez Will Not Affect § 13981
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court refused to uphold a federal
criminal statute banning firearms within 1,000 feet of a school because its link to
interstate commerce was too tenuous.310 The Lopez decision brings into question all
the statutes and laws that have been passed under Congress's exceptionally broad
Commerce Clause power to regulate and legislate activities that have a substantial
economic impact on interstate commerce. Specifically, the Lopez decision threatens
the use and constitutionality of § 13981 because its constitutional foundation is
rooted within the Commerce Clause.311 Ultimately, the Lopez decision will have no
impact on § 13981 because of its many differences from the Lopez situation.
First, § 13981 involves a civil rights remedy and not a criminal remedy.





308. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949,969 n.13 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575,583-88 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 248 of FACE)); United States v.
Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142, 144-46 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Indian Major Crimes Act); EPA v. Olin Corp., 107
F.3d 1506,1509-10(11 th Cir. 1997) (upholdingCERLA); UnitedStatesv.Tisor,96F.3d370,373-75 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding prohibition ofintrastate possession orsale of narcotics); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479-82
(9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Sodema, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (7th Cir. 1996)
(upholding FACE); United States v. Hawkins, 104F.3d437, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding § 860(a) ofthe Drug
Free School Zones Act); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695,700-01 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding § 860(a) of the Drug
Free School Zones Act)).
309. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 969 n.13.
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activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Third, § 13981 has a much
stronger nexus to its impact on interstate commerce to justify its creation.3?1 2 Fourth,
the lack of ajurisdictional element is not fatal to § 13981 because jurisdiction is only
one of many factors considered in a Commerce Clause analysis. The Brzonkala
court's reliance on and interpretation of Lopez effected a perverse result of finding
§ 13981 unconstitutional. Because the court's arguments reflect common
misreadings of Lopez, § 922 will be distinguished from § 13981.
1. Section 13981 Does Not Violate the Tenth Amendment
One of the most important differences between § 922 and § 13981 is that §
13981 is a civil statute and not a criminal statute. Section 922, unlike § 13981,
constituted a direct intervention into a traditional state area-criminal law. However,
§ 13981 does nothing to impede a state from prosecuting domestic violence abusers
or rapists. In fact, a § 13981 claim may be filed and litigated independent of any
state claim.31 3 Additionally, nothing in § 13981 strips states of their "primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."3 14  As the Doe court
recognized, instead of "federalizing" state law, § 13981 "complements ... [state
laws] by recognizing a societal interest in ensuring that persons have a civil right to
be free from gender-based violence.' '315 The statute expressly does not allow a cause
of action for "random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be
demonstrated... to be motivated by gender." 316
In the same vein, the idea that § 13981 "federalizes" family and criminal law
is equally flawed for two reasons. First, the express language of the statute states:
Neither section 1367 of Title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall be
construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the
courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the
establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or
child custody decree.317
The idea that women would file false claims simply to ensure a more favorable
divorce decree is as stupid as it is sexist. As with most legislation, there are
restrictions and penalties for filing false claims that easily supplant the "risk"of
frivolous claims.
Second, § 13981 covers the gamut of gender-based violence regardless of the
312. Many of the findings are outlined and detailed supra Part I.
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (e)(2) (1994) ( Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution,
or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection (c) of this section.").
314. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
315. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,616 (D. Conn. 1996).
316. 42U.S.C.§ 13981 (e)(I) (1994).
317. Id.§ 13981 (e)(4).
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relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. Instead of viewing § 13981 in
a family law context, it is more correctly viewed as an anti-discrimination law which
seeks to alleviate discriminatory violence against women."' While a substantial
amount of violence against women occurs within the context of the family, the
prosecution of such crimes does not involve family law but rather civil rights law.
Section 13981 was created to allow women to prosecute crimes committed against
them regardless of the woman's relationship with the perpetrator. For instance, §
13981 could cover stranger rape as well as marital rape providing the requirements
of the statute are met. Paradoxically, it may be easier to bring a case under § 13981
if the victim and perpetrator are strangers because the burden of proof (i.e., animus
of women) will be more difficult to meet between intimates because of societal
attitudes.
2. Lopez Does Not Restrict Congress's Commerce Clause Authority
The defendants in both Doe and Brzonkala advanced the argument that since
violence against women is not an economic activityper se, it could not be considered
in the aggregate to calculate its effect on interstate commerce.319 While violence
against women on its face does not appear to have an economic link, the high
workplace absenteeism by women who are abused, the increasing insurance rates and
medical expenses required to treat battered women, and the loss of productivity that
is directly attributable to women who are harassed, provoked, or stalked in the
workplace all result in a high economic cost on the national economy.32 These costs
are a few of the numerous examples illustrating-the economic link between violence
against women and interstate commerce. However, reading Lopez to restrict
congressional authority to cover only those activities with an express commercial link
constitutes a serious misinterpretation.
The Supreme Court "has never held that the precise activity in question must
itself be commercial or economic in nature. ' 321 Were this true Congress would have
been unable to prohibit discrimination because discrimination in and of itself is not
economic in nature. 22 "The error of this argument is in its premise-if one describes
conduct so narrowly that it describes nothing but itself one has, by definition, made
the conduct unconnected to anything, including commerce." 323  Had the Court
intended this result in Lopez it would have stated so explicitly. It is unlikely the
Court intended such an interpretation because it would result in overturning the
318. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 971 (4th Cir. 1997) ("VAWA...
[is] a civil rights law, a quintessential area of federal expertise, in response to 'existing bias and discrimination in the
criminal justice system."' (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-771, at 385 (1994))).
319. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,614-15 (D. Conn. 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Instit. & State
Univ., 139 F.3d 949, 966-67 (4th Cir. 1997).
320. The substantial costs to the national economy are outlined supra Part I.C.
321. Nourse, supra note 4, at 20.
322. See id.
323. Id. at 21.
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majority of civil rights legislation passed under the broad Commerce Clause power,
including the 1964 Civil Rights Act. "The Court has stressed that, even in the face
of conflicting Supreme Court decisions, lower courts are not to assume that Supreme
Court precedent has been implicitly overruled; 324 this is exactly what the Brzonkala
court did.
The Brzonkala court interpreted Lopez to mean that where the "regulated
intrastate activity is economic in nature" precedent involving economic activities, like
Wickard, "do not control."3' However, this interpretation is not stated explicitly or
implicitly in theLopez decision precisely to uphold precedent passed under the liberal
Commerce Clause view. Clearly cases like Wickard are still to be considered in
determining whether a non-economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. The Court in Lopez cited directly from Wickard when it held that
Wickard "involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school
zone does not. 326 Furthermore, the Brzonkala court misread the facts in Wickard
because the statute involved, like § 13981, did not "arise out of" nor was it
"connected with a commercial transaction." 327 "Wickard involved no commercial
transaction; the farmer grew the wheat for his family's consumption and for use on
the farm."32 Instead the Court looked to the nexus or connection between the activity
regulated and its effect on interstate commerce.329 Although § 13981 like Wickard
does not involve an economic activity per se, it still passes constitutional muster
under the Commerce Clause because its connection to and impact on interstate
commerce has been substantiated.
3. Congressional Findings Meet Substantial Effect Standard
As set forth in Section I, the problem of violence against women is acute in the
United States. Through a limited examination of rape and domestic violence laws,
it is apparent that state laws have failed to provide a successful legal remedy for
victims of gender-based violence. After conducting numerous hearings and
establishing many committees, Congress concluded that violence against women
constituted a substantial societal and economic problem warranting federal
regulation.33 °
The Lopez Court focused on the fact that Congress failed to establish a clear
nexus between gun possession and interstate commerce.33' The Court additionally
324. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,794 (W.D. Va. 1996).
325. Id. at 787.
326. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,560 (1995).
327. Id.at561.
328. Stephen M. Mcjohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L.
REV. 1,28 (1995).
329. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
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considered the noticeable lack of legislative and congressional findings to support the
connection between gun possession and its impact on interstate commerce.332 Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in Lopez that while congressional findings are not necessary:
"to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking
here. ' 333 Likewise, the effect of gun possession on interstate commerce was not, in the
words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "visible to the naked eye" on the face of the
statute.334 The congressional findings and legislative history of § 13981 clearly reveal
that gender-based crimes are a constant and real threat. In contrast, the Supreme
Court criticized the implementation of § 922 because it was based upon tenuous
future harms instead of actual harms.335 It was a combination of these factors
coupled with the infringement into traditional areas of state sovereignty that
culminated in § 922 being declared unconstitutional.336
4. Lopez Does Not Require a Jurisdictional Element
The Court considered the lack of a jurisdictional element in Lopez a fatal flaw;
however, it was only one of several factors considered by the Court in making its
determination on constitutionality. 337 In fact, "[p]rior to Lopez, the concept of a
jurisdictional element did not present itself in Commerce Clause case law." 38
The Seventh Circuit recently considered the treatment of jurisdictional elements
in United States v. Wilson 39 which upheld the constitutionality of the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE") despite its lack of a jurisdictional
element.340 The Wilson court held that in reference to jurisdictional elements, "the
Court simply did not state or imply that all criminal statutes must have such an
element, or that all statutes with such an element would be constitutional, or that any
statute without such an element is per se unconstitutional., 34' Further, the Wilson
court interpreted the jurisdictional element as more of an assurance of
constitutionality and not "a prerequisite of constitutionality." '342 Despite FACE not
having a jurisdictional element, challenges to its constitutionality have survived six
332. See id. at 562-63.
333. Id. at 563. The Fifth Circuit stated in its decision striking down § 922 that much deference isgiven to legislative
and congressional findings if there is any rational basis for them. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364(5th
Cir. 1993).
334. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
335. See id. at 567.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 561-67.
338. Shargel, supra note 25, at 1859.
339. 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
340. See id.
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other courts.343
FACE is not the only legislation to pass constitutional muster without a
jurisdictional element since the Lopez decision. The Drug Free School Zones Act and
an anti-loan sharking act have both been upheld post-Lopez despite the lack of a
jurisdictional element. 3" While the Brzonkala court considered the lack of a
jurisdictional element to be significant, the court itself conceded that whether "such
a jurisdictional requirement is needed" is "unclear." '345
Without a clear consensus from the Court on the importance or unimportance
of a jurisdictional element, this element can only be considered one of many factors
to consider in the constitutional analysis. Because § 13981 was clearly shown to
have a substantial impact on interstate commerce and because it does not offend the
Tenth Amendment by infringing on exclusive areas of state power, § 13981 meets the
constitutional requirements articulated in Lopez.
B. Practical Applications of§ 13981
As illustrated by the legislative history, the Violence Against Women Act and
in particular § 13981 had a difficult and arduous passage through Congress. 346 While
VAWA represents a giant step forward in raising consciousness concerning violence
against women, § 13981, which was so strenuously opposed, in practice will not have
a significant impact in eradicating crimes against women. The main strength of §
13981, rather, is in its societal message that crimes based upon gender will not be
tolerated. Section 13981 is a first step in changing societal attitudes that crimes
against women are serious enough to warrant federal attention. Burt Neuborne, a
constitutional scholar who testified on behalf of the constitutional foundation of §
13981, commented on the impact that federal legislation has on the national psyche:
One of the things that Federal civil rights legislation has always done is that it has
reached down into the maelstrom of ordinary acts and picked out a group of them
for community scrutiny in the high-visibility telescope of what the Federal courts
can bring to bear, and to do this to gender-motivated violence at this point in the
343. See, e.g., United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913,919-21 (8th Cir. 1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,
1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1433-34 (C.D. Cal. 1995); United States v.
Scott,919 F. Supp. 76,78-79 (D. Conn. 1996); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1423-24 (D. Kan. 1995);
United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 47 (1996).
344. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. &State Univ., 132 F.3d 949,969 n. 13 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575,583-88 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 248 of FACE)); United States v.
Lomayaoma, 86F.3d 142, 144-46 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Indian Major Crimes Act); EPA v. Olin Corp., 107
F.3d 1506,1509-10(1 lth Cir. 1997) (upholding CERLA); United States v.Tisor,96 F.3d 370,373-75 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding prohibition of intrastate possession or sale ofnarcotics); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479-82
(9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Sodema, 82 F.3d 1370,1373-74(7th Cir. 1996)
(upholding FACE); United States v. Hawkins, 104F.3d 437,439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding § 860(a) of the Drug
Free School Zones Act); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695,700-01(6th Cir. 1997) (upholding § 860(a) of the Drug
Free School Zones Act)).
345. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,792 (W.D. Va. 1996).
346. Many of the findings are outlined and detailed supra Part 1.
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Nation's evolution I think is a tremendously important step.347
Additionally, the federal forum is an enticement to attorneys and judges who
otherwise might not consider litigating crimes against women. "[T]he high esteem in
which all those associated with the federal forum are held-judges, attorneys, and
litigants alike-will translate into a strong message that violence against women is
a problem worthy of serious attention in a prestigious forum."3' Indeed, by Sen.
Biden's own words, VAWA was created as a catalyst to alter societal empathy
concerning violence against women: "My intention in making this a civil rights
violation is to change the Nation's attitude. I know of no circumstance under which
the Nation has concluded that there is a serious problem where that problem has not
been reflected in legislative form. I know of none."349
This emphasis on changing societal perceptions of violence against women is
pivotal because the practical difficulties of litigating crimes against women still exist
even with § 13981. Section 13981 may be problematic because (1) access to the
legal system, especially for women of color and impoverished women, continues to
be a problem; and (2) the burden of proving gender animus may prove problematic
depending upon the relationship between the victim and perpetrator.
Women's traditional lack of access to the legal system has been a difficult
obstacle to overcome, especially for women of color and impoverished women.350
Language barriers and illiteracy rates could render § 13981 meaningless to women
who cannot learn of its existence, let alone bring a claim. Unfortunately, neither the
express language of § 13981 nor the congressional findings address this problem
effectively. Because this is a civil rights remedy, the prestige of bringing a case under
§ 13981 may entice attorneys to accept these cases on a pro bono basis or encourage
them to work with local legal aid clinics to ensure disadvantaged women have equal
access to § 13981 remedies.
In addition to social and economic barriers, the burden of proof may also prove
difficult in litigating claims under § 13981. Section 13981 defines "crime of violence
motivated by gender" as a crime "committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." 351 While
"crime of violence" is defined as any act which would "constitute a felony" or one
that would constitute a felony "but for the relationship between" the victim and
perpetrator, it does not define "animus.,, 35
2
Despite this ambiguity, § 13981 was designed not to cover all crimes against
women, but only those that constitute a violation of a woman's civil rights (in other
347. Victims of the System Hearings 102-369, supra note 19, at 127 (statement of ProEf. Burt Neubome).
348. Maloney, supra note 41, at 1902 (citing Judith Resnick, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts:
Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L.REv. 171,220-21 (1995)).
349. Senate Hearings Part!, 101-939, supra note 100, at 62 (opening statement ofSen. Biden) (emphasis added).
350. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 412-13. See also, Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the
Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y463, 469-73,
511 n.54 (1996).
351. 42U.S.C.§ 13981(d)(1) (1994).
352. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(A), (B).
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words, those crimes that are motivated by gender). In essence, § 13981 is an anti-
discrimination measure; to allow it to be more would infringe on traditional areas of
state authority. The question then becomes exactly what crimes against women are
motivated by gender. Most feminists would argue that rape, domestic violence, and
sexual harassment are by definition gender-biased crimes.353 However, during the
legislative process that presumption was deliberately removed from the statute.354 In
reality, most of the crimes committed against women will rarely fit under § 13981.
Although the legislative history reveals that § 13981 is to be proven by
considering many of the same factors a court might consider in a racially-motivated
crime, race and gender are not identical.355 This lack of similarity is evidenced by the
fact that previous civil rights statutes have failed to sufficiently address problems
specific to women because of gender.356
Since the passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, few cases have
been litigated under § 13981. Because the majority of the cases brought under §
13981 have focused almost exclusively on the constitutionality of § 13981, it is
difficult to predict how issues of proof will impact future litigation.357 What is
353. See CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3 (1987) "The first
theme is the analysis that the social relation between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women must
submit and this relation is sexual-in fact, is sex. Men in particular, if not men alone, sexualize inequality, especially
the inequality of the sexes." Id. (citation omitted). "Rape, battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children,
prostitution, and pornography, seen for the first time in their true scope and interconnectedness, form a distinctive
pattem: the power of men over women in society." Id. at 5.
The crime of rape ... is defined around penetration. That... [is] a very male point of view on
what it means to be sexually violated. And it isexactly what heterosexuality as asocial institution
is fixated around, the penetration of the penis into the vagina. Rape is defined according to what
men think violates women, and that is the same as what they think of as the sine qua non of sex.
What women experience as degrading and defiling when we are raped includes as much that is
distinctive to us as is our experience of sex.
Id. at 87.
354. See S.REP.NO. 102-197, at28 (1991).
355. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 50 (1993).
To satisfy the burden of establishing a civil rights cause of action, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's act was motivated by gender bias. This civil rights cause of action is no different than
the cause of action an African-American might use. For example, an Africa-American man or a
woman who is the victim of an assault, cannot under our present laws say, "My civil rights were
violated because I am an African-American and someone that wasn't African-American did me
harm." He or she must prove racial animus. Similarly, a woman who is attacked and seeks relief
under []itle III must demonstrate that the defendant attacked her because she is a woman and that
the attacker was motivated, at least in part, by her gender. For example, she might offer proof that
a defendant entered a department store, carrying a gun, picked out women in the store and shot her
while screaming anti-women epithets, and leaving the many nearby men unharmed. The fact that
the attacker in this example verbally expressed his bias against women is helpful, but not
mandatory. The fact that the attacker segregated the men from the women and then shot only the
women might be evidence enough of his gender-based motivation.
Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added).
356. See discussion supra Part II about the ineffectiveness of current civil rights statutes in addressing gender-based
violence.
357. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa. 1997) (holding that VAWA was a constitutional
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding
that VAWA did not violate the Commerce Clause); Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.
N.Y. 1997) (holding that VAWA was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power); Mattison v. Click Corp.
of America, Inc., 1998 WL32597 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that VAWA passes constitutional muster); Seaton v. Seaton,971
F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (holding that VAWA is constitutional).
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entirely predictable is until the Supreme Court clarifies its decision in Lopez, the full
potential of § 13981 will not be realized because it will continue to be plagued with
constitutional challenges.
V. CONCLUSION
The Violence Against Women Act was enacted as an ambitious attempt to
rectify the horrific atrocities women face daily in terms of violence and abuse. To
that end, § 13981 was created to grant women a civil forum in which to seek redress
of crimes committed against them simply because they are women. While § 13981
was vehemently opposed by several groups, including ChiefJustice Rehnquist and the
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, constitutional scholars, legislators, and women's
advocates collaborated to pass VAWA in 1994 as part of the President's crime bill.
To date few cases have been brought under § 13981. The cases brought have
all been constitutional challenges to § 13981 caused by the recent Supreme Court
decision in Lopez. While there are many differences between §13981 and § 922, at
least one court refused to rule on the constitutionality of § 13981 because of the
conflicting results generated by Doe and Bronzkala. The Fourth Circuit's decision
will prove critical to the future health of § 13981. Should the Fourth Circuit affirm
the district court's decision, the Supreme Court must accept the Bronzkala case on
certiorari to clarify the meaning and intent of Lopez. It is clear that based upon the
legislative history of § 13981 and the evidence adduced through multiple
congressional hearings that violence against women has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce warranting federal action. However, the evident resistance to
this civil rights remedy crystallizes the fact that to survive further scrutiny, the Court
must address any possible constitutional problems created by Lopez.
A cynic may view these constitutional challenges to § 13981 as yet another
attempt to subjugate women, as if the passage of § 13981 were not difficult enough.
Considering the number of violent crimes against women is reaching epidemic
proportions coupled with the fact that these crimes reach much further than the initial
victim, these challenges arguably are a deliberate attempt to prevent women from
asserting control over their own lives. Regardless, the need for § 13981 is clear-if
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